Skills/ClawHub/planning-with-files

planning-with-files@3.28.2

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Persistent planning files for multi-step AI-agent work. Keeps task_plan.md, findings.md and progress.md on disk and restores selected project context through lifecycle hooks. Automatic recovery reads project files only; session-history access is explicit and optional." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher othmanadi · publishing for 100 daysInstalls 46,273Last detonated 7 h ago
$clawhub install planning-with-files
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:307 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code| `npx skills add OthmanAdi/planning-with-files` (or ClawHub) | SKILL.md, scripts, templates only | No, follow the manual fallback below |Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/inject-plan.py:1681 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageSKILL.md:389 · Authorization escalation languageThe mode is set by writing a `.mode` file next to the plan (`.planning/<id>/.mode`, or `./.mode` in legacy root mode). `init-session` writes it for you when you pass `--autonomous` or `--gated`.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
CRITICAL
Fake instruction boundary tagSKILL.md:364 · Fake instruction boundary tag4. Issue Claude Code's native `/loop <interval> <prompt>` (CC primitive, always available).Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/inject-plan.py:1435 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/set-active-plan.sh:792 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod =rw "${temp_file}" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/inject-plan.sh:515 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# permanently kill injection at this root over a plan that cannotFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/inject-plan.sh:128 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# a copied project tree) would otherwise kill injection permanently with noFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/skill-hook.sh:89 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# set -u is active: an unset IFS or PATH must not kill the hook.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/skill-hook.sh:359 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions# chmod intentionally changes st_mode. Freeze the directory object acrossFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/inject-plan.sh:920 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 700 "$SNAP_ROOT" 2>/dev/null || :Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/resolve-plan-dir.sh:337 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# above already does it; a non-zero status would kill callers running underFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/skill-hook.sh:360 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions# that operation, then use the post-chmod identity for every later check.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈10,605 tok
1 file · 35 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

planning-with-files@3.28.2 safety verdict: Verified (install only) — KillerSkills