permission-vending-machine@1.1.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Multi-channel approval system for AI agent permissions. GATES sensitive operations (file deletion, git force-push) behind human approval. Notifies via iMessage, Email, Discord, Telegram, Slack — and enforces time-limited grants before dangerous commands run. Use when an agent needs permission to delete files, force-push, or perform destructive operations." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Discord webhook URL; Slack webhook URL; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
webhook_url: "https://discord.com/api/webhooks/..."Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.result = os.system(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.default=existing.get("channels", {}, {}).get("slack", {}).get("webhook_url", "https://hooks.slack.com/..."),Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.safe-rm -rf /tmp/buildFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.- `safe-rm -rf /path` — checks path scope grantFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.print(f" sudo mv {unit_path} /etc/systemd/system/pvm.service")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."Must be a Discord webhook URL" if not v.startswith("https://discord.com/api/webhooks/") else q.ValidationResult.SUCCESS,Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.# Use your Mac mini's LAN IP (e.g. http://192.168.0.28:8080) ifFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.print(" sudo systemctl daemon-reload")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.print(" sudo systemctl start pvm")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.print(" sudo systemctl enable pvm")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# Use your Mac mini's LAN IP (e.g. http://192.168.0.28:8080) ifFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.default_base = "http://192.168.0.1:7823"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# If user runs: safe-rm /tmp/myfileFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.f"chmod +x {tmp_path.parent}/wrappers/safe-rm 2>/dev/null || true"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.default_base = "http://192.168.0.1:7823"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.webhook_url: "https://discord.com/api/webhooks/fake"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim tylerdotai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Discord webhook URL≈ +4 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
- Slack webhook URL≈ +4 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- OS command execution function call detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.