perkoon-transfer@2.1.7
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "The agent data layer. Perkoon moves files between agents and the physical world — agent to human, agent to agent, agent to pipeline. Small files get free cloud delivery — a durable link, fire-and-forget, no receiver needed. Larger files stream direct P2P over WebRTC, no size limit. Free. Encrypted. Unlimited. No accounts. CLI, MCP server, A2A protocol, browser automation — pick the interface that fits your runtime." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 55/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Destructive file system command detected; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
7. NEVER kill the process mid-transfer (relay sends exit on their own — nothing to babysit after `relay_complete`)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.npx -y [email protected] send /path/to/file --json --timeout 1800 > /tmp/perkoon-send.log 2>&1 &Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.**IMPORTANT**: Use `npx -y [email protected]` (pinned version) to avoid dynamic fetching of unaudited code.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx -y [email protected] send /path/to/file --session CODE --sender-key KEY --json --timeout 1800 > /tmp/perkoon-send.log 2>&1 &Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.10. NEVER send files from sensitive directories (~/.ssh, ~/.gnupg, /etc) without explicit user approvalFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.rm -f /tmp/perkoon-send.log /tmp/perkoon-send.pidFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.- **Cursor / VS Code / Windsurf**: Settings → MCP → Add Server → `npx -y @perkoon/[email protected]`Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.rm -f /tmp/perkoon-send.log /tmp/perkoon-send.pidFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Install: `npx -y @perkoon/[email protected]` (stdio transport, pinned version)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.rm -f /tmp/perkoon-send.log /tmp/perkoon-send.pidFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.rm -f /tmp/perkoon-send.log /tmp/perkoon-send.pidFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.rm -f /tmp/perkoon-recv.log /tmp/perkoon-recv.pidFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
25 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim alex-vy: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.