pdf-font-fixer@1.1.0
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "PDF 中文字体乱码与「能显示但打印不出来」的体检与修复工具。导出前检测字体风险,交付前逐字符审计并做交付门禁,也能直接修复已有 PDF 的方块字、缺字、文字消失。支持 PDF 字体检测、字体字典结构校验、字体修复、PPT 转 PDF 递进导出、缺字兜底;不内嵌任何字体,自动发现本机可用的 TrueType 中文字体。其它 skill 导出 PDF 后必须调用 gate.py 作为交付门禁。当用户提到 PDF 乱码、方块字、问号、字体缺失、打印异常、打印机报错(如佳能「未导入太大的图像或格式不受支持的文件」)、手机预览异常、PPT 导出 PDF、PDF 字体检查时使用。" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 8 of 12 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What changed since 1.0.2
vet-skills diff pdf-font-fixer 1.0.2 1.1.0This version reaches for something 1.0.2 did not: 5 new hosts (apple.com, ghostscript.com, google.com, microsoft.com, …). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
- New hosts
- apple.com, ghostscript.com, google.com, microsoft.com, wenq.org
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
Debian/Ubuntu : sudo apt-get install ghostscriptFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Fedora : sudo dnf install ghostscriptFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.r = subprocess.run(['fc-list', ':', 'file', 'family', 'fontformat'],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.call(cmd)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Debian/Ubuntu:sudo apt-get install fonts-wqy-microhei fonts-noto-cjk(⚠️ noto-cjk 是 CFF,装了也用不上)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.r = subprocess.run(['fc-list', ':lang=zh', 'file', 'family', 'fontformat'],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Debian/Ubuntu : sudo apt-get install ghostscriptFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.rc = subprocess.call([sys.executable, fixpy, p, '--replace'])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Fedora : sudo dnf install ghostscriptFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.r = subprocess.run(['fc-list', ':', 'file', 'family', 'fontformat'],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim sedey999: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.