Skills/ClawHub/patrick

patrick@1.0.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Access Patrick's expertise library for executive decision infrastructure. List, fetch, and manage structured expertise with context variables. Use for executive briefings, decision framing, and strategic analysis." Observed in sandbox: calls portal.patrickbot.io only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher mcsh · publishing for 280 daysInstalls 2,142Last detonated 7 h ago

Coverage

Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: calls portal.patrickbot.io only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.4sfilesystemread ~/.patrick/bin/patrick-cli outside project
0.4sfilesystemwrote ~/.patrick/bin/patrick-cli
0.4snetworkCONNECT tcp://portal.patrickbot.io:443
0.4snetworkCONNECT tcp://portal.patrickbot.io:443
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/uname
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/tr
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/mktemp
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/grep
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/awk
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/sha256sum
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/rm
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.8sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
1.2sfilesystemread ~/.patrick/bin/patrick-cli outside project
1.2sfilesystemwrote ~/.patrick/bin/patrick-cli
1.2snetworkCONNECT tcp://portal.patrickbot.io:443
1.2snetworkCONNECT tcp://portal.patrickbot.io:443
1.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
1.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/uname
1.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/tr
1.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
1.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/mktemp
1.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/grep
1.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/awk
1.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/sha256sum
1.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/rm
1.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod

Static findings

MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellSKILL.md:27 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -fsSL https://portal.patrickbot.io/downloads/latest/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Pipe-to-shell patternSKILL.md:27 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -fsSL https://portal.patrickbot.io/downloads/latest/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinstall.sh:93 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$INSTALL_DIR/patrick-cli"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,258 tok
1 file · 4 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mcsh: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
  3. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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