p2claw@0.1.1

BLOCKED· install only

Publisher claims: "Publishes apps you've built locally as peer-to-peer URLs that anyone with the link can open in a browser. Use when the user wants to share a working app — bu..." Observed in sandbox: sends data to release-assets.githubusercontent.com.

Registry ClawHubPublisher phact · publishing for 198 daysInstalls 781Last detonated 1 min ago

Coverage

Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 47/100 (Blocked). Do not install it: the sandbox observed behaviour consistent with credential theft, exfiltration or persistence. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Privileged sudo command; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: sends data to release-assets.githubusercontent.com.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.6snetworkCONNECT tcp://api.github.com:443
0.6snetworkCONNECT tcp://github.com:443
0.6snetworkCONNECT tcp://release-assets.githubusercontent.com:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.6sprocessexec /usr/bin/uname
0.6sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.6sprocessexec /usr/bin/sed
0.6sprocessexec /usr/bin/head
0.6sprocessexec /usr/bin/mktemp
0.6sprocessexec /usr/bin/rm
0.6sprocessexited 1: error: download failed. Verify that p2claw-v0.10.21-linux-x86_64.tar.gz exists at https://github.com/phact/p2claw-skill/releases/v0.10.21
0.6sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.6sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.8sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
1.1snetworkCONNECT tcp://api.github.com:443
1.1snetworkCONNECT tcp://github.com:443
1.1snetworkCONNECT tcp://release-assets.githubusercontent.com:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
1.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/uname
1.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
1.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/sed
1.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/head
1.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/mktemp
1.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/rm
1.1sprocessexited 1: error: download failed. Verify that p2claw-v0.10.21-linux-x86_64.tar.gz exists at https://github.com/phact/p2claw-skill/releases/v0.10.21

Static findings

MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/install.sh:6 · Remote installer piped to shell# curl -fsSL https://p2claw.com/install | sh -s -- --version v0.1.0Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/install.sh:165 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$DEST"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/install.sh:73 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code3. Re-run inside WSL: ${BLD}curl -fsSL https://p2claw.com/install | sh${RST}Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/install.sh:73 · Remote installer piped to shell3. Re-run inside WSL: ${BLD}curl -fsSL https://p2claw.com/install | sh${RST}Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:195 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges> `~/Library/LaunchAgents/dev.p2claw.agent.plist`, no sudo required.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandSKILL.md:379 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesp2claw upgrade --disable # kill switch; persists across rebootsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/install.sh:5 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code# curl -fsSL https://p2claw.com/install | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/install.sh:5 · Remote installer piped to shell# curl -fsSL https://p2claw.com/install | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/install.sh:6 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code# curl -fsSL https://p2claw.com/install | sh -s -- --version v0.1.0Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/install.sh:7 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code# curl -fsSL https://p2claw.com/install | sh -s -- --prefix /usr/local/binFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/install.sh:7 · Remote installer piped to shell# curl -fsSL https://p2claw.com/install | sh -s -- --prefix /usr/local/binFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:235 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo p2claw service install --systemFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,645 tok
1 file · 3 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

33 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
  2. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  3. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim phact: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  4. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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