Skills/ClawHub/outlook-mcp

outlook-mcp@1.25.1

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "Production-grade MCP server for personal Outlook (Outlook.com / Hotmail / Live). 77 typed Graph tools across mail, inbox rules, calendar, contacts, to-do, drafts, attachments, folders, threading, batch ops, delta-sync. Granular permissions, OS-keyring auth, /$batch-optimized triage and bulk read. Built for agents that need real Outlook coverage, not a CLI wrapper. BYO Azure app; zero telemetry." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher mpalermiti · joined 5 days agoInstalls 2,884Last detonated 5d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-10-29 and scored it 63/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Credential pass-through configuration; Credential pass-through configuration. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.1sprocessexec .venv/bin/outlook-mcp
0.1sprocessexited 127: timeout: failed to run command '.venv/bin/outlook-mcp': No such file or directory
0.1sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 127)
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsrc/outlook_mcp/server.py:149 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/outlook_mcp/config.py:219 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_attachment_paths.py:172 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/outlook_mcp/tools/mail_attachments.py:102 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsrc/outlook_mcp/toolsets.py:11 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/outlook_mcp/tools/mail_attachments.py:101 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/outlook_mcp/config.py:335 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_config.py:545 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_delta_url_validation.py:41 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandtests/test_config.py:279 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_mail_read_bulk.py:287 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Credential pass-through configurationtests/test_tool_surface_budget.py:72 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_config.py:177 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_validation.py:418 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Credential pass-through configurationtests/test_tool_surface_budget.py:87 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandtests/test_mail_attachments.py:672 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/test_mail_attachments.py:130 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_keychain_collision.py:246 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_delta_url_validation.py:256 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_validation.py:66 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtests/test_validation.py:524 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_startup_degrades.py:208 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandtests/test_attachment_paths.py:111 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandtests/test_config.py:37 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_server.py:489 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_mail_attachments.py:193 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandtests/test_config.py:50 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_config.py:132 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

What would make this Verified

17 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mpalermiti: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Does not do what the description says≈ +5 on the totalIn the sandbox the skill never performed the task it claims (no call to the service it is for). Make sure the happy path runs without extra setup, or describe the real behavior.
  3. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
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