opencli-rs@1.0.0
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "基于Rust的通用命令行枢纽 - 将任何网站、桌面应用、本地CLI工具转变为命令行接口,专为AI Agent和自动化工作流设计。支持55+网站、Electron应用控制和外部CLI集成,单二进制文件4.7MB,性能提升12倍。" Observed in sandbox: reads credential files.
Coverage
Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 61/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: reads credential files.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 3 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nashsu/opencli-rs/main/scripts/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.sudo rm /usr/local/bin/opencli-rsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo cp target/release/opencli-rs /usr/local/bin/Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo mv opencli-rs /usr/local/bin/Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo mv opencli-rs /usr/local/bin/Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nashsu/opencli-rs/main/scripts/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.sudo rm /usr/local/bin/opencli-rsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nashsu/opencli-rs/main/scripts/install.sh | shFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.chmod +x ~/.opencli/examples/collect-data.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nashsu/opencli-rs/main/scripts/install.sh | shFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.2. Open `chrome://extensions`, enable Developer modeFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.npm install -g @jackwener/opencli@latestFix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.autoUpdate: trueFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.2. Open `chrome://extensions`, enable Developer modeFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nashsu/opencli-rs/main/scripts/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.chmod +x ~/.opencli/examples/basic-usage.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.2. Open `chrome://extensions`, enable Developer modeFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nashsu/opencli-rs/main/scripts/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
19 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs. Seen: ~/.npmrc.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim smallnest: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.