openclaw-vps-deploy@1.1.0
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Deploy a custom OpenClaw repo (official or forked) to a Hostinger VPS and make it accessible via the cloud. Use when setting up a new OpenClaw instance on a..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Destructive file system command detected; References a credential file in the home directory. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
run(client, "curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_22.x | bash - 2>&1 | tail -3", timeout=60)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.check_call([sys.executable, "-m", "pip", "install", "paramiko", "--break-system-packages", "-q"])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.run(client, "curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_22.x | bash - 2>&1 | tail -3", timeout=60)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.run(client, f"rm -rf /opt/openclaw && git clone --depth 1 {repo} /opt/openclaw", timeout=120)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.chmod 600 /tmp/vps_keyFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.--key ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 \Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.run(client, "ln -sf /opt/openclaw/dist/index.js /usr/local/bin/openclaw && chmod +x /usr/local/bin/openclaw", timeout=10)Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.--key ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 \Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.run(client, f"mkdir -p /run/user/0 && chmod 700 /run/user/0", timeout=10)Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.--key ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 \Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.run(client, "chmod 600 /root/.openclaw/openclaw.json && chmod 700 /root/.openclaw", timeout=10)Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.--key ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 \Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim maverick-software: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.