Skills/ClawHub/openclaw-vps-deploy

openclaw-vps-deploy@1.1.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Deploy a custom OpenClaw repo (official or forked) to a Hostinger VPS and make it accessible via the cloud. Use when setting up a new OpenClaw instance on a..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher maverick-software · publishing for 259 daysInstalls 1,293Last detonated 12 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Destructive file system command detected; References a credential file in the home directory. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: subprocess.CalledProcessError: Command '['/usr/bin/python3', '-m', 'pip', 'install', 'paramiko', '--break-system-packages', '-q']' returned non-zero exit status 1.
0.1sprocess1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/deploy.py:80 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote coderun(client, "curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_22.x | bash - 2>&1 | tail -3", timeout=60)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/deploy.py:38 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.check_call([sys.executable, "-m", "pip", "install", "paramiko", "--break-system-packages", "-q"])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/deploy.py:80 · Remote installer piped to shellrun(client, "curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_22.x | bash - 2>&1 | tail -3", timeout=60)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedscripts/deploy.py:96 · Destructive file system command detectedrun(client, f"rm -rf /opt/openclaw && git clone --depth 1 {repo} /opt/openclaw", timeout=120)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:52 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 /tmp/vps_keyFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorySKILL.md:28 · References a credential file in the home directory--key ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 \Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/deploy.py:100 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsrun(client, "ln -sf /opt/openclaw/dist/index.js /usr/local/bin/openclaw && chmod +x /usr/local/bin/openclaw", timeout=10)Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorySKILL.md:22 · References a credential file in the home directory--key ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 \Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/deploy.py:195 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsrun(client, f"mkdir -p /run/user/0 && chmod 700 /run/user/0", timeout=10)Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:22 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files--key ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 \Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/deploy.py:161 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsrun(client, "chmod 600 /root/.openclaw/openclaw.json && chmod 700 /root/.openclaw", timeout=10)Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:28 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files--key ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 \Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,379 tok
1 file · 5 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim maverick-software: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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