openclaw-soul@3.0.1
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "OpenClaw 自我进化框架一键部署。安装宪法(AGENTS.md)、可进化灵魂(SOUL.md)、心跳系统、六层记忆架构、目标管理、思维方法论(HDD/SDD)、安全审查(skill-vetter),并通过场景化对话引导用户定义 Agent 性格。用户可选安装 EvoClaw(审批制进化)、Self-Impr..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 50/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files; URL with embedded credentials; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
chmod +x "$WORKSPACE/scripts/"*.jsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.**Corrections** → add to `corrections.md`, evaluate for `memory.md`:Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.@import url('https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=JetBrains+Mono:wght@300;400;500;700&family=DM+Sans:ital,wght@0,300;0,400;0,500;0,700;1,400&display=swap');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose..env*Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.**Preference signals** → add to `memory.md` if explicit:Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.chmod +x "$WORKSPACE/scripts/auto-commit.sh"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.- .env / credentials: [有没有未使用的认证或服务?]Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Patterns confirmed by user, never decayFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.@import url('https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=JetBrains+Mono:wght@300;400;500;700&family=DM+Sans:ital,wght@0,300;0,400;0,500;0,700;1,400&display=swap');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.chmod +x "$WORKSPACE/scripts/health-check.sh"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.| 脚本不可执行 | 权限问题 | `chmod +x "$WORKSPACE/scripts/auto-commit.sh"` |Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.Add to your AGENTS.md or workspace config:Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Update `AGENTS.md` by complementing the existing `## Memory` section. Do not replace the whole section and do not remove existing lines.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.- Reusable global rule or preference → append to `~/self-improving/memory.md`Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.| 文件权限错误 | 文件不可读 | `chmod 644 "$WORKSPACE/SOUL.md"` |Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.### Step 8: Update AGENTS.mdFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.- Update `long-term-memory.md` with new user patterns or lessons (Layer 4)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.3. Update `MEMORY.md` with distilled learnings from reflectionsFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.3. Update `working-memory.md`: change "Awaiting BOOTSTRAP" to "BOOTSTRAP complete, operating normally"Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Add this in the Memory area of AGENTS.md:Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Do the work. Update `working-memory.md` as you go:Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
30 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim kianzzz: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.