Skills/ClawHub/openclaw-skill-gastown

openclaw-skill-gastown@0.1.4

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Multi-agent coding orchestrator using Gas Town (gt) and Claude Code. Use for ANY non-trivial coding task — multi-file changes, new features, refactors, bug fixes, anything involving code that needs to compile/run/test. Delegates work to parallel Claude Code agents (polecats) with git-backed persistent state, work tracking (beads), and coordination. Use when a task involves more than a single file edit or quick script." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher saesak · publishing for 288 daysInstalls 3,347Last detonated 58 min ago

Coverage

Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.0sprocessexited 1:
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.1sprocessexited 1:

Static findings

HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:520 · Destructive file system command detectedsudo rm -rf /usr/local/go && sudo tar -C /usr/local -xzf go1.24.12.linux-amd64.tar.gzFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLSKILL.md:502 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code source/bin/bash -c "$(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/HEAD/install.sh)"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedscripts/setup.sh:38 · Destructive file system command detectedrm /tmp/go.tar.gzFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Agent configured for autonomous execution without human approvalSKILL.md:288 · Agent configured for autonomous execution without human approvalAutonomous agents may start without user input, so they need mail checked at session start. Interactive agents wait for user prompts.Fix: Declare and request only the permissions the task needs.
AST02
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:516 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt install -y gitFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:525 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt install -y tmuxFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:515 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt updateFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:520 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo rm -rf /usr/local/go && sudo tar -C /usr/local -xzf go1.24.12.linux-amd64.tar.gzFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈16,315 tok
1 file · 5 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim saesak: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  4. Agent configured for autonomous execution without human approval≈ +4 on the totalDeclare and request only the permissions the task needs.
  5. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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