openclaw-skill-diy-pc-ingest@2.0.1
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Ingest pasted PC parts purchase/config text (Discord message receipts, bullet lists) into Notion DIY_PC tables (PCConfig, ストレージ, エンクロージャー, PCInput). Use when the user pastes raw purchase logs/spec notes and wants the AI to classify, enrich via web search, ask follow-up questions for unknowns, and then upsert rows into the correct Notion data sources using the 2025-09-03 data_sources API." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 3 of 3 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 92/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
console.log('Usage: node scripts/bootstrap_config.js [--out PATH] [--names pcconfig=... pcinput=... storage=... enclosure=...]');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.No other findings across 1,714 lines in 8 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.