Skills/ClawHub/openclaw-security-guard

openclaw-security-guard@1.0.0

CAUTION· startup only

Publisher claims: "Security audit CLI + live dashboard for OpenClaw. Scans for secrets, config issues, prompt injections, vulnerable dependencies, and unverified MCP servers. Zero telemetry." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher miloudbelarebia · publishing for 279 daysInstalls 2,531Last detonated 7 h ago

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 34 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
14sprocessdependency install exit 0
34sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · report [options] Generate security report hooks <action> Manage git hooks (install|uninstall|status) about About this tool help [command] display help for command
34sprocessscript backend runs setup only
34sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset

Static findings

MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedsrc/utils/i18n.js:53 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsconfigAudit: '\u062a\u062f\u0642\u064a\u0642 \u0627\u0644\u0625\u0639\u062f\u0627\u062f\u0627\u062a',Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/scanners/secrets-scanner.js:180 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesbasename.startsWith('.env') ||Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/scanners/secrets-scanner.js:141 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files'.env.template',Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedsrc/utils/i18n.js:55 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsdependencyScan: '\u0641\u062d\u0635 \u0627\u0644\u062a\u0628\u0639\u064a\u0627\u062a',Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedsrc/utils/i18n.js:52 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloadssecretsScan: '\u0641\u062d\u0635 \u0627\u0644\u0623\u0633\u0631\u0627\u0631',Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/scanners/config-auditor.js:410 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsfix: `chmod 600 ${filePath}`,Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/scanners/config-auditor.js:377 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files'.env'Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/cli/index.js:166 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(chalk.green(`\n📄 Report saved: ${options.output}`));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/scanners/secrets-scanner.js:140 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files'.env.sample',Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/cli/index.js:414 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx openclaw-guard scan secrets --quickFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedsrc/utils/i18n.js:54 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloadspromptInjectionScan: '\u0643\u0634\u0641 \u062d\u0642\u0646 \u0627\u0644\u0623\u0648\u0627\u0645\u0631',Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/cli/index.js:394 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(chalk.green(`✅ Report saved: ${outputPath}`));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/scanners/secrets-scanner.js:139 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files'.env.example',Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/scanners/secrets-scanner.js:170 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files'.env', '.sh', '.bash', '.zsh',Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/scanners/config-auditor.js:394 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsfix: `chmod 600 ${filePath}`,Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialssrc/dashboard/server.js:259 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineering<p class="text-slate-400 text-sm mt-2">Enter your password</p></div>Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/scanners/mcp-server-auditor.js:30 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files{ pattern: /process\.env/g, severity: 'low', message: 'Accesses environment variables' }Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injection attemptdocs/api/programmatic.md:133 · Prompt injection attempt — 'ignore previous instructions' · informational: not an instruction fileconst result = await checkPromptInjection('ignore all previous instructions');Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectiondocs/en/README.md:440 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file2. **Role Manipulation** - "you are now DAN"Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedsrc/utils/i18n.js:57 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloadssummary: '\u0627\u0644\u0645\u0644\u062e\u0635',Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
LOW
Prompt injection attemptdocs/api/programmatic.md:25 · Prompt injection attempt — 'ignore previous instructions' · informational: not an instruction fileconst check = await checkPromptInjection('ignore previous instructions');Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectiondocs/en/README.md:442 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file4. **Jailbreak** - Known jailbreak phrasesFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injection attemptREADME.md:232 · Prompt injection attempt — 'ignore previous instructions' · informational: not an instruction fileconst check = await checkPromptInjection('ignore all previous instructions');Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injection attemptdocs/en/README.md:439 · Prompt injection attempt — 'ignore previous instructions' · informational: not an instruction file1. **Instruction Override** - "ignore previous instructions"Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.md:94 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file| **Prompt Injection Detector** | 50+ patterns: instruction overrides, role hijacking, data exfiltration, delimiter manipulation, jailbreak attempts. |Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectiondocs/fr/README.md:351 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file4. **Jailbreak** - Phrases de jailbreak connuesFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectiondocs/fr/README.md:349 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file2. **Manipulation de Rôle** - "you are now DAN"Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injection attemptdocs/fr/README.md:348 · Prompt injection attempt — 'ignore previous instructions' · informational: not an instruction file1. **Override d'Instructions** - "ignore previous instructions"Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injection attemptdocs/fr/README.md:447 · Prompt injection attempt — 'ignore previous instructions' · informational: not an instruction fileconst result = await checkPromptInjection('ignore all previous instructions');Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injection attemptdocs/en/README.md:565 · Prompt injection attempt — 'ignore previous instructions' · informational: not an instruction fileconst result = await checkPromptInjection('ignore all previous instructions');Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈496 tok
1 file · 26 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim miloudbelarebia: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Unicode escape sequence detected≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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