Skills/ClawHub/openclaw-plus

openclaw-plus@1.1.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Multi-capability dev skill for chained workflows involving Python execution, package management, git, HTTP requests, file operations, process management, sub..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher shindo957-official · publishing for 170 daysInstalls 1,967Last detonated 1 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 59/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Credential pass-through configuration. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationSKILL.md:411 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials- **Sub-agents:** Don't pass secrets in the task string — inject them via environment variables instead.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
Process kill commandSKILL.md:197 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes- Always kill background processes when done — don't leave orphansFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionevals/evals.json:128 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"prompt": "Create a temp file 'temp_output.txt', write some content to it, move it to 'final/output.txt', then verify the original is gone.",Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:133 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesfile_ops("move", "temp_output.csv", dest="final/output.csv")Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandevals/evals.json:150 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"prompt": "Start a long-running background process (e.g. a simple HTTP server), verify it's running, then kill it and confirm it's stopped.",Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/implementation.py:105 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/implementation.py:133 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/implementation.py:163 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/implementation.py:53 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/implementation.py:170 · Python subprocess execution detectedbranch_result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREFERENCE.md:135 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file- System packages need sudo accessFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,327 tok
1 file · 12 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

21 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim shindo957-official: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim shindo957-officialPropose a patch to the maintainer