Skills/ClawHub/openclaw-memvid-logger

openclaw-memvid-logger@1.2.6

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Logs all OpenClaw conversations and events with role tags, saving to JSONL and Memvid for full context search and monthly sharded or single-file storage." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher stackblock · publishing for 269 daysInstalls 1,769Last detonated 32 min ago
$clawhub install openclaw-memvid-logger
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · 1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.0sprocessexited 1:
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocess1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexited 1:

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtools/log.py:67 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandinstall.sh:43 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesread -p "Install Memvid CLI now? (requires sudo for global install) (y/N) " -n 1 -rFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
Prompt injection attemptSKILL.md:366 · Prompt injection attempt — model control tokens└── [system] eventsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
Prompt injection attemptSKILL.md:196 · Prompt injection attempt — model control tokens| **System** | `[system]` | "When did the **cron job** run?" |Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtools/log.py:210 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinstall.sh:79 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "${TARGET_DIR}/tools/log.py"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injection attemptREADME.md:278 · Prompt injection attempt — model control tokens · informational: not an instruction file| **System** | `[system]` | ✅ Cron, heartbeats, events |Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:33 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions- File permissions: restrict access to log files (`chmod 600`)Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injection attemptinstructions.md:21 · Prompt injection attempt — model control tokens · informational: not an instruction file- `[system]` - System eventsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injection attemptREADME-clawhub.md:66 · Prompt injection attempt — model control tokens · informational: not an instruction file| **System** | `[system]` | Cron, heartbeats, events |Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,033 tok
1 file · 18 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.