Skills/ClawHub/openclaw-macos-always-on

openclaw-macos-always-on@1.0.1

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Run OpenClaw as a system-level LaunchDaemon on macOS for 24/7 operation, surviving screen lock, logout, and user switching. Uses caffeinate to prevent sleep...." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher happydog-intj · publishing for 270 daysInstalls 1,620Last detonated 24 min ago

Coverage

Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Destructive file system command detected; Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/whoami
0.0sprocessexited 1:
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/whoami
0.1sprocessexited 1:

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commandinstall.sh:149 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo launchctl bootout system/ai.openclaw.gateway 2>/dev/null && echo " Stopped existing LaunchDaemon" || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:654 · Destructive file system command detectedsudo rm /Library/LaunchDaemons/ai.openclaw.gateway.plistFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLSKILL.md:35 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourcecurl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/YOUR_USERNAME/clawd/master/skills/macos-launchdaemon/install.sh | bashFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:166 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo launchctl print system/ai.openclaw.gateway | head -10Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandinstall.sh:21 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho "The script will ask for sudo password when needed."Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:149 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo chown root:wheel /Library/LaunchDaemons/ai.openclaw.gateway.plistFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:146 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo cp /tmp/ai.openclaw.gateway.plist /Library/LaunchDaemons/Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Pipe-to-shell patternSKILL.md:35 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/YOUR_USERNAME/clawd/master/skills/macos-launchdaemon/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandinstall.sh:156 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo chown root:wheel "$PLIST_PATH"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellSKILL.md:35 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/YOUR_USERNAME/clawd/master/skills/macos-launchdaemon/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:271 · Destructive file system command detectedsudo rm /Library/LaunchDaemons/ai.openclaw.gateway.plistFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:153 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo launchctl bootstrap system /Library/LaunchDaemons/ai.openclaw.gateway.plistFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:596 · Destructive file system command detectedsudo rm /Library/LaunchDaemons/ai.openclaw.gateway.plistFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:150 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo chmod 644 /Library/LaunchDaemons/ai.openclaw.gateway.plistFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandinstall.sh:155 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo cp "$TEMP_PLIST" "$PLIST_PATH"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandinstall.sh:157 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo chmod 644 "$PLIST_PATH"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:394 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionssudo chmod 644 "$PLIST_PATH"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:149 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionssudo chown root:wheel /Library/LaunchDaemons/ai.openclaw.gateway.plistFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:393 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionssudo chown root:wheel "$PLIST_PATH"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:429 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x install-launchdaemon.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinstall.sh:156 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionssudo chown root:wheel "$PLIST_PATH"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandSKILL.md:493 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -9 <PID>Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:150 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionssudo chmod 644 /Library/LaunchDaemons/ai.openclaw.gateway.plistFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:65 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file- **Admin access** (sudo required for installation)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinstall.sh:157 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionssudo chmod 644 "$PLIST_PATH"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,280 tok
1 file · 5 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim happydog-intj: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  5. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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