openclaw-iflow-doctor@1.1.0
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "AI-powered auto-repair system for OpenClaw with iflow integration. Automatically diagnose and fix crashes, config errors, model issues. Falls back to iflow-h..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · 6 of 6 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 63/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; Destructive file system command detected; Destructive command against a filesystem root or device. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 3 scenariosStatic findings
result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."del \"%USERPROFILE%\\.openclaw\\openclaw.json\" /Q 2>nul",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."del \"%~f0\""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."rm -f \"$0\""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."chmod -R u+rw \"$HOME/.openclaw\"",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."del \"%~f0\""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."chown -R $(whoami):$(whoami) ~/.openclaw/",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.self.log(f"Output: {result.stdout[:200]}")Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why."chmod 600 ~/.openclaw/*.json",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts."rm -f \"$HOME/.openclaw/memory/\"index.*",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."rm -f \"$0\""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."rm -f \"$HOME/.openclaw/openclaw.json\"",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."del \"%~f0\""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."rm -f \"$0\""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."del \"%USERPROFILE%\\.openclaw\\memory\\index.*\" /Q 2>nul",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.echo "请使用 sudo 运行此脚本"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
17 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim kosei-echo: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.