Skills/ClawHub/openclaw-hardening

openclaw-hardening@2.1.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Secure an OpenClaw server with host hardening, chainwatch runtime safety, pastewatch secret redaction, and noisepan+entropia news intelligence. Use when sett..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher ppiankov · publishing for 233 daysInstalls 902Last detonated 1 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 45/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Destructive file system command detected; Destructive command against a filesystem root or device. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:13 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges- Root/sudo accessFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:412 · Destructive file system command detectedchainwatch exec --profile clawbot -- rm -rf / # ❌ blockedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceSKILL.md:412 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicechainwatch exec --profile clawbot -- rm -rf / # ❌ blockedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:113 · Destructive file system command detected| `rm -rf /`, `rm -rf ~` | `rm -f /tmp/file` |Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:114 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges| `sudo su`, `sudo -i` | `mkdir`, `cp`, `mv` |Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageSKILL.md:13 · Authorization escalation language- Root/sudo accessFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellSKILL.md:116 · Remote installer piped to shell| `curl \| sh` | `apt install`, `npm install` |Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLSKILL.md:41 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourcecurl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ppiankov/chainwatch/main/scripts/install-openclaw.sh | sudo bashFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Pipe-to-shell patternSKILL.md:116 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code| `curl \| sh` | `apt install`, `npm install` |Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:41 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegescurl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ppiankov/chainwatch/main/scripts/install-openclaw.sh | sudo bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellSKILL.md:41 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ppiankov/chainwatch/main/scripts/install-openclaw.sh | sudo bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:103 · Destructive file system command detectedchainwatch exec --profile clawbot -- rm -rf /tmp/old-data # checkedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:36 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesChainwatch blocks destructive commands (rm -rf /, sudo su, curl|sh, fork bombs) and routes all LLM API traffic through an intercept proxy.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:36 · Destructive file system command detectedChainwatch blocks destructive commands (rm -rf /, sudo su, curl|sh, fork bombs) and routes all LLM API traffic through an intercept proxy.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellSKILL.md:36 · Remote installer piped to shellChainwatch blocks destructive commands (rm -rf /, sudo su, curl|sh, fork bombs) and routes all LLM API traffic through an intercept proxy.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:133 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions-o /usr/local/bin/pastewatch-cli && chmod +x /usr/local/bin/pastewatch-cliFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:117 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions| `chmod -R 777 /` | `chmod 600 specific-file` |Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:51 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions-o /usr/local/bin/chainwatch && chmod +x /usr/local/bin/chainwatchFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:31 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 700 ~/.openclaw/credentialsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellSKILL.md:389 · Remote installer piped to shell| Chainwatch denylist | rm -rf, sudo escalation, fork bombs, curl\|sh |Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,607 tok
1 file · 2 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

35 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ppiankov: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  6. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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