Skills/ClawHub/openclaw-claudecode

openclaw-claudecode@1.1.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Control Claude Code (cc) via tmux to execute development tasks. Use for: starting CC development sessions, sending development commands, monitoring progress,..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher fanzhidongyzby · publishing for 209 daysInstalls 917Last detonated 13 h ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 64/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Fake instruction boundary tag; Fake instruction boundary tag; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

CRITICAL
Fake instruction boundary tagSKILL.md:206 · Fake instruction boundary tagtmux send-keys -t cc-<project> "<prompt>" EnterFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Process kill commandSKILL.md:297 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill <PID1> <PID2>Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellSKILL.md:45 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
CRITICAL
Fake instruction boundary tagSKILL.md:146 · Fake instruction boundary tagtmux send-keys -t <session_name> "<prompt>" EnterFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Pipe-to-shell patternSKILL.md:45 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,989 tok
1 file · 2 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

16 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim fanzhidongyzby: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  3. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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