openclaw-claude-delegate@0.2.6
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Give Claude back to OpenClaw through a local Claude Code delegation lane with dispatch, poll, result, resume, and an optional non-root bypassPermissions runn..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · 8 of 8 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 63/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 3 scenariosStatic findings
console.log(' npx openclaw-claude-delegate install --force');Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.ROOT_CLAUDE_CREDS="${ROOT_CLAUDE_CREDS:-/root/.claude/.credentials.json}"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.sudo -u "$DELEGATE_RUNNER_USER" -H envFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.runner_cmd=(sudo -u "$CLAUDE_RUNNER_USER" -H env "${runner_env[@]}" "${CLAUDE_BIN:-claude}")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.console.log(' npx openclaw-claude-delegate');Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.chmod +x "$SCRIPT_DIR/$script"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/$REPO_SLUG/main/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.- `CLAUDE_OAUTH_ENV_FILE=~/.claude/.oauth-token.env` or `/root/.claude/.oauth-token.env` when running as rootFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.cmd=(sudo -u "$CLAUDE_RUNNER_USER" -H env HOME="$CLAUDE_RUNNER_HOME")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.cp "$ROOT_CLAUDE_CREDS" "$RUNNER_HOME/.claude/.credentials.json"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.chmod 600 "$RUNNER_HOME/.claude/.credentials.json"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chown "$RUNNER_USER:$RUNNER_USER" "$RUNNER_HOME/.acpx/config.json"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/$REPO_SLUG/main/install.sh | bashFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.chown "$RUNNER_USER:$RUNNER_USER" "$RUNNER_HOME/.claude/.credentials.json"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.chown -h "$RUNNER_USER:$RUNNER_USER" "$RUNNER_HOME/.local/bin/claude"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chown "$RUNNER_USER:$RUNNER_USER" "$RUNNER_HOME/.claude/.credentials.json"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.kill -TERM "$pid" 2>/dev/null && echo "Killed PID $pid" || echo "PID $pid not running"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo -u "$RUNNER_USER" -H env HOME="$RUNNER_HOME" npm install --prefix "$install_root" --no-save "acpx@$spec" >/dev/null 2>&1Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.find "$TARGET_DIR/scripts" -type f -name '*.sh' -exec chmod +x {} + 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod +x "$TARGET_DIR/install.sh" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/$REPO_SLUG/main/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.chown "$RUNNER_USER:$RUNNER_USER" "$RUNNER_HOME"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod 600 "$RUNNER_HOME/.claude/.credentials.json"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
17 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim henryclaw007-lgtm: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.