Skills/ClawHub/openclaw-claude-delegate

openclaw-claude-delegate@0.2.6

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Give Claude back to OpenClaw through a local Claude Code delegation lane with dispatch, poll, result, resume, and an optional non-root bypassPermissions runn..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher henryclaw007-lgtm · publishing for 202 daysInstalls 855Last detonated 16 h ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · 8 of 8 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 63/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 3 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.1sfilesystemread ~/.agents/skills/claude-delegate/scripts · ~/.agents/skills/claude-delegate/scripts/setup.sh outside project
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/tar
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/find
0.1sprocessexec /app/apps/web/node_modules/.bin/chmod
0.1sprocessexec /root/.cache/node/corepack/v1/pnpm/10.28.0/dist/node-gyp-bin/chmod
0.1sprocessexec /app/node_modules/.bin/chmod
0.1sprocessexec /pnpm/chmod
0.1sprocessexec /usr/local/sbin/chmod
0.1sprocessexec /usr/local/bin/chmod
0.1sprocessexec /usr/sbin/chmod
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/ln
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/id
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.1sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/id
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.2sprocessexited 1:
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.2sprocessexited 1: Usage: ./scripts/cc-profile.sh <profile> <dispatch|resume|env> ...
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/readlink
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/id
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.4sprocessexited 1: Runner home not found: /home/ccbot
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocessexited 1: Usage: ./scripts/notify-openclaw.sh <agent-id> <session-id> [lane-label]
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.4sprocessexited 1: {"error": "No task provided", "usage": "run-task.sh run <workdir> <budget> <model> <task>"}
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.6sfilesystemread ~/.agents/skills/claude-delegate/scripts · ~/.agents/skills/claude-delegate/scripts/setup.sh outside project
0.6sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.6sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.6sprocessexec /usr/bin/tar
0.6sprocessexec /usr/bin/find
0.6sprocessexec /app/apps/web/node_modules/.bin/chmod
0.6sprocessexec /root/.cache/node/corepack/v1/pnpm/10.28.0/dist/node-gyp-bin/chmod
0.6sprocessexec /app/node_modules/.bin/chmod
0.6sprocessexec /pnpm/chmod
0.6sprocessexec /usr/local/sbin/chmod
0.6sprocessexec /usr/local/bin/chmod
0.6sprocessexec /usr/sbin/chmod
0.6sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
0.6sprocessexec /usr/bin/ln
0.6sprocessexec /usr/bin/id
0.6sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.6sprocess8 of 8 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.6sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.6sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.7sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.7sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.7sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.7sprocessexited 1: [claude-delegate] ERROR: Target already exists: /tmp/ks-detonate-VpW0g7/later/home/.agents/skills/claude-delegate (rerun with --force to back it up and replace it)
0.8sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.8sprocessexec /usr/bin/id
0.8sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.8sprocessexited 1:

Static findings

MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebin/openclaw-claude-delegate.js:19 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeconsole.log(' npx openclaw-claude-delegate install --force');Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/ensure-nonroot-delegation.sh:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesROOT_CLAUDE_CREDS="${ROOT_CLAUDE_CREDS:-/root/.claude/.credentials.json}"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/run-task.sh:51 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo -u "$DELEGATE_RUNNER_USER" -H envFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/claude-delegate.sh:69 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesrunner_cmd=(sudo -u "$CLAUDE_RUNNER_USER" -H env "${runner_env[@]}" "${CLAUDE_BIN:-claude}")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebin/openclaw-claude-delegate.js:18 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeconsole.log(' npx openclaw-claude-delegate');Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/setup.sh:102 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$SCRIPT_DIR/$script"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellinstall.sh:37 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/$REPO_SLUG/main/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:219 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file- `CLAUDE_OAUTH_ENV_FILE=~/.claude/.oauth-token.env` or `/root/.claude/.oauth-token.env` when running as rootFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/setup.sh:57 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegescmd=(sudo -u "$CLAUDE_RUNNER_USER" -H env HOME="$CLAUDE_RUNNER_HOME")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/ensure-nonroot-delegation.sh:60 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescp "$ROOT_CLAUDE_CREDS" "$RUNNER_HOME/.claude/.credentials.json"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/ensure-nonroot-delegation.sh:62 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "$RUNNER_HOME/.claude/.credentials.json"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/ensure-nonroot-delegation.sh:70 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschown "$RUNNER_USER:$RUNNER_USER" "$RUNNER_HOME/.acpx/config.json"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLinstall.sh:37 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourcecurl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/$REPO_SLUG/main/install.sh | bashFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/ensure-nonroot-delegation.sh:61 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileschown "$RUNNER_USER:$RUNNER_USER" "$RUNNER_HOME/.claude/.credentials.json"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/ensure-nonroot-delegation.sh:53 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschown -h "$RUNNER_USER:$RUNNER_USER" "$RUNNER_HOME/.local/bin/claude"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/ensure-nonroot-delegation.sh:61 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschown "$RUNNER_USER:$RUNNER_USER" "$RUNNER_HOME/.claude/.credentials.json"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/cc-orchestrator.sh:687 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -TERM "$pid" 2>/dev/null && echo "Killed PID $pid" || echo "PID $pid not running"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/ensure-nonroot-delegation.sh:85 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo -u "$RUNNER_USER" -H env HOME="$RUNNER_HOME" npm install --prefix "$install_root" --no-save "acpx@$spec" >/dev/null 2>&1Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinstall.sh:128 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsfind "$TARGET_DIR/scripts" -type f -name '*.sh' -exec chmod +x {} + 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinstall.sh:129 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$TARGET_DIR/install.sh" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patterninstall.sh:37 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/$REPO_SLUG/main/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/ensure-nonroot-delegation.sh:38 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschown "$RUNNER_USER:$RUNNER_USER" "$RUNNER_HOME"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/ensure-nonroot-delegation.sh:62 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileschmod 600 "$RUNNER_HOME/.claude/.credentials.json"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈714 tok
1 file · 18 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

17 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim henryclaw007-lgtm: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim henryclaw007-lgtmPropose a patch to the maintainer