Skills/ClawHub/openclaw-action

openclaw-action@1.0.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "GitHub Action for automated security scanning of agent workspaces. Detects exposed secrets, prompt/shell injection, and data exfiltration patterns in PRs and commits." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher atlaspa · publishing for 280 daysInstalls 1,648Last detonated 5 h ago
$clawhub install openclaw-action
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocess1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/scan.py:162 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injection attemptREADME.md:43 · Prompt injection attempt — model control tokens · informational: not an instruction file- Prompt injection markers (`[SYSTEM]`, `<|im_start|>`)Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLaction.yml:57 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourcecurl -sL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AtlasPA/openclaw-egress/main/scripts/egress.py \Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/scan.py:22 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLaction.yml:53 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourcecurl -sL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AtlasPA/openclaw-sentry/main/scripts/sentry.py \Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLaction.yml:55 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourcecurl -sL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AtlasPA/openclaw-bastion/main/scripts/bastion.py \Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈524 tok
1 file · 5 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.