Skills/ClawHub/open-browser

open-browser@0.1.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Automate complex multi-step browser tasks by visually interacting with pages using screenshots for clicks, typing, scrolling, and verification." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher softpudding · publishing for 238 daysInstalls 1,305Last detonated 43 min ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 69/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Authorization escalation language; Prompt injection. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Authorization escalation languageSKILL.md:109 · Authorization escalation language| 1 | Load extension | `chrome://extensions/` → Developer mode → Load unpacked → `extension/dist` |Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
CRITICAL
Prompt injectionSKILL.md:109 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference| 1 | Load extension | `chrome://extensions/` → Developer mode → Load unpacked → `extension/dist` |Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languagereferences/setup.md:39 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file2. Enable **Developer mode** (toggle in top-right)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionreferences/setup.md:39 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file2. Enable **Developer mode** (toggle in top-right)Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/send_task.py:286 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,435 tok
1 file · 7 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

11 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim softpudding: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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