Skills/ClawHub/one-mail

one-mail@1.3.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "统一邮箱管理 CLI,支持 Gmail、Outlook、网易邮箱(163.com、126.com)。适用于:(1) 收取/发送邮件,(2) 跨账户搜索邮件,(3) 管理多个邮箱账户,(4) 查看邮件统计。当用户提到邮件、邮箱、email、发邮件、收邮件、查邮件时触发。" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher huangbaixun · publishing for 259 daysInstalls 1,550Last detonated 55 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · 8 of 11 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.0sprocessexited 127: ./scripts/install.sh: line 23: sudo: command not found
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.1sfilesystemwrote ~/.onemail/config.json · ~/.onemail/credentials.json
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.1sprocessexited 1:
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexited 1:
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexited 1: ❌ 配置文件不存在,请先运行: bash scripts/setup.sh
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.2sprocessexited 1: ❌ 配置文件不存在,请先运行: bash scripts/setup.sh
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.2sprocessexited 1: ❌ 缺少收件人 (--to)
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.2sprocessexited 1: ❌ 配置文件不存在,请先运行: bash scripts/setup.sh
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocess8 of 11 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.4sprocessexited 127: ./scripts/install.sh: line 23: sudo: command not found
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
0.4sprocessexited 1:

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/lib/common.sh:59 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "$CREDS_FILE"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/install.sh:15 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho "⚠️ 需要 sudo 权限安装到 $INSTALL_DIR"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/uninstall.sh:27 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo rm -f "$INSTALL_DIR/onemail"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedscripts/lib/html2text.py:181 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloadstext = re.sub(r'[\u200b\u200c\u200d\u200e\u200f\ufeff\u034f]', '', text)Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/setup.sh:15 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 700 "$CONFIG_DIR"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/setup.sh:45 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "$CREDS_FILE"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈454 tok
1 file · 20 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs. Seen: ~/.onemail/credentials.json.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim huangbaixun: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
  4. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. Unicode escape sequence detected≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
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