Skills/ClawHub/officecli-pptx

officecli-pptx@1.0.3

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Use this skill any time a .pptx file is involved -- as input, output, or both. This includes: creating slide decks, pitch decks, or presentations; reading, parsing, or extracting text from any .pptx file; editing, modifying, or updating existing presentations; combining or splitting slide files; wor" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher iceyliu · publishing for 137 daysInstalls 1,506Last detonated 2d ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 62/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellSKILL.md:12 · Remote installer piped to shell- **macOS / Linux**: `curl -fsSL https://d.officecli.ai/install.sh | bash`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:521 · Destructive file system command detected- **Gate 2 — overflow / format / structure.** `officecli view "<file>" issues`. If it lists *any* issue (lines tagged `[O1]`, `[C1]`, `[S1]`, …) → REJECT, fix, re-run until clean.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Pipe-to-shell patternSKILL.md:12 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code- **macOS / Linux**: `curl -fsSL https://d.officecli.ai/install.sh | bash`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈11,112 tok
1 file · 2 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

18 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim iceyliu: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim iceyliuPropose a patch to the maintainer
officecli-pptx@1.0.3 safety verdict: Caution (static only) — KillerSkills