Skills/ClawHub/nft-skill

nft-skill@1.0.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Autonomous AI Artist Agent for generating, evolving, minting, listing, and promoting NFT art on the Base blockchain. Use when the user wants to create AI art, mint ERC-721 NFTs, list on marketplace, monitor on-chain sales, trigger artistic evolution, or announce drops on X/Twitter." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher numba1ne · publishing for 283 daysInstalls 2,460Last detonated 5 h ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 58/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/cli.js:93 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify({ status: 'running', message: 'Posting tweet...' }));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/deploy.ts:52 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeconsole.log(` npx hardhat verify --network base-mainnet ${nftAddress} ${deployer.address}`);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:68 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesThe user must populate a `.env` file with their keys:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:84 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesContract addresses are automatically written to `.env` after deployment.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/skills/social.ts:62 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[Social] Posted successfully: ${tweet.data.id}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/cli.ts:62 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify({ status: 'running', message: 'Posting tweet...' }));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:71 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescp {baseDir}/.env.example {baseDir}/.envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/skills/social.js:53 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[Social] Posted successfully: ${tweet.data.id}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/skills/social.js:51 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[Social] Posting to X: ${tweetText.substring(0, 50)}...`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/deploy.ts:27 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst envPath = path.join(__dirname, '../.env');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:267 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Common issues: missing `.env` variables, insufficient wallet balance, network RPC errors.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/deploy.ts:53 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeconsole.log(` npx hardhat verify --network base-mainnet ${marketplaceAddress}`);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/skills/social.ts:59 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[Social] Posting to X: ${tweetText.substring(0, 50)}...`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/deploy.ts:26 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Write addresses to .env (append/update)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,287 tok
1 file · 44 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

22 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim numba1ne: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  4. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim numba1nePropose a patch to the maintainer