Skills/ClawHub/music-craft

music-craft@1.8.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Generate songs, instrumentals, or lyrics-driven tracks through a structured OpenClaw-native workflow with anti-sparse prompt engineering and quality verification. Provider-agnostic — works with any music backend the runtime exposes (ACE-Step, MusicGen, Stable Audio, or a cloud CLI). Includes local helpers for a loopback ACE-Step server (submit, wait, duration check, cache recovery), lyrics linting, and optional stem separation (Demucs) and stem remixing (ffmpeg) of the user's own local audio files." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher luischarro · publishing for 6 daysInstalls 1,268Last detonated 6d ago
$clawhub install music-craft
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/remix_stems.py:64 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(command, text=True).returncodeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:457 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…`scripts/extract_stems.py` | a local audio file you pass | stem files and `stems.json` in the output folder you choose | none (Demucs may download its own model weights on first us…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
LOW
Prompt injection attemptreferences/lrc-generation.md:694 · Prompt injection attempt — model control tokens · informational: not an instruction file"[Bridge]", "[Outro]", "[Break]", "[Inst]", "[Solo]",Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/wait_for_acestep.py:44 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/wait_for_acestep.py:5 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesIt does not kill jobs; it reports timeout with the best known state.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Fake instruction boundary tagreferences/other-backends.md:234 · Fake instruction boundary tag · informational: not an instruction file-F "prompt=<prompt>" \Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedSKILL.md:1 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content---Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
LOW
Prompt injection attemptreferences/structure-tags.md:57 · Prompt injection attempt — model control tokens · informational: not an instruction file| `[Inst]` | Pure instrumental section, no vocals |Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injection attemptreferences/lrc-generation.md:526 · Prompt injection attempt — model control tokens · informational: not an instruction file`[mm:ss.xx][Inst]` instead of forcing a timestamp.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈10,400 tok
1 file · 35 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.