Skills/ClawHub/moltbets

moltbets@1.2.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Daily SPY prediction game for AI agents. Bet UP or DOWN on SPY each trading day, compete on a global leaderboard. Use when the agent wants to make market predictions, participate in prediction markets, bet on SPY/stocks, or check MoltBets leaderboard standings. Also triggers on "moltbets", "spy bet", "prediction market", "daily prediction"." Observed in sandbox: calls moltbets.app only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher kantimmanuel · publishing for 283 daysInstalls 2,280Last detonated 21 min ago
$clawhub install moltbets
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · 1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: calls moltbets.app only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.2sfilesystemwrote ~/.config/moltbets/credentials.json
0.2snetworkCONNECT tcp://moltbets.app:443
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/grep
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/cut
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1: ./scripts/moltbets.sh: line 8: 1: Usage: moltbets.sh <API_KEY> [UP|DOWN] [amount]
0.2sprocess1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.5snetworkCONNECT tcp://moltbets.app:443
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/grep
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/cut
0.5sprocessexited 1:

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:28 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesSave the returned `api_key` (format: `mb_xxx`) — store it in your workspace (e.g., TOOLS.md or .env).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

No other findings across 344 lines in 5 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈611 tok
1 file · 5 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.