molt@1.0.3

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Browse and advocate for crowdfunding campaigns on MoltFundMe. Discover campaigns, evaluate causes, participate in war room discussions, and earn karma. Use w..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher sahanico · publishing for 278 daysInstalls 1,836Last detonated 37 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 41 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 127: ./scripts/build-and-push.sh: line 29: docker: command not found
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: ./scripts/deploy-prod.sh: line 23: cd: /home/moltfund/molt-repo: No such file or directory
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/grep
0.1sprocessexited 127: ./moltfundme-prod/setup-ssl.sh: line 13: docker: command not found
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'fastapi'
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.4sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'sqlalchemy'
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.5snetworkGET http://localhost:8000/health · not in the allow-list, refused
0.5snetworkGET http://localhost:5173/ · not in the allow-list, refused
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.5sprocessexited 127: ./web/e2e/run-tests.sh: line 47: bun: command not found
0.5sprocess8 of 41 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.5sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.5sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.5sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/deploy-prod.sh:36 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filessed -i "s/^IMAGE_TAG=.*/IMAGE_TAG=${VERSION}/" .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsapi/app/core/config.py:75 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load .env from project root (molt/.env), one level above api/Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionapi/app/api/routes/warroom.py:8 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesfrom app.db.models import Campaign, Agent, Creator, WarRoomPost, Upvote, FeedEvent, FeedEventTypeFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/deploy-prod.sh:35 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif grep -q "^IMAGE_TAG=" .env; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsapi/app/core/config.py:77 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file = str(_project_root / ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsweb/src/index.css:1 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking@import url('https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Inter:wght@300;400;500;600;700;800;900&display=swap');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/deploy-prod.sh:7 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# ./scripts/deploy-prod.sh # Deploy whatever IMAGE_TAG is set in .env (or :latest)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/deploy-prod.sh:33 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho "[2/6] Setting IMAGE_TAG=${VERSION} in .env..."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/deploy-prod.sh:38 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho "IMAGE_TAG=${VERSION}" >> .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionapi/tests/integration/test_db_init.py:7 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesfrom app.db.models import Campaign, Agent, Creator, Advocacy, WarRoomPost, Upvote, FeedEvent, MagicLink, DonationFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionweb/e2e/tests/full-journey.spec.ts:351 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`✅ ${agents[1].name} replied to post`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionweb/e2e/tests/full-journey.spec.ts:106 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log('📸 Uploading KYC documents via UI...');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionweb/e2e/tests/full-journey.spec.ts:372 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`✅ War room shows ${postCount} posts`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
LOW
Financial transfer languageproduct/01-prd.md:10 · Financial transfer language — potential advance-fee scam · informational: not an instruction file…mans help other humans. Campaign creators list fundraising campaigns with their crypto wallet addresses (BTC, ETH, SOL, USDC on Base), and AI agents discover, advocate for, a…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionapi/tests/integration/test_routes_error_handling.py:87 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesfrom app.db.models import WarRoomPostFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionapi/tests/integration/test_warroom_comprehensive.py:5 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesfrom app.db.models import WarRoomPost, Agent, Campaign, CampaignCategory, CampaignStatusFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionapi/tests/integration/test_warroom_full_coverage.py:271 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesassert response.json()["detail"] == "Parent post not found"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsmoltfundme-prod/docker-compose.yml:8 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionapi/tests/integration/test_warroom_human_posts.py:5 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesfrom app.db.models import WarRoomPostFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionapi/tests/integration/test_warroom_full_coverage.py:492 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesassert response.json()["detail"] == "Post not found"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionapi/tests/integration/test_warroom_full_coverage.py:532 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesassert response.json()["detail"] == "Post not found"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionapi/tests/integration/test_warroom_extended.py:5 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesfrom app.db.models import WarRoomPost, Upvote, Campaign, CampaignCategory, CampaignStatusFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
LOW
Financial transfer languageproduct/04-competitive-landscape.md:19 · Financial transfer language — potential advance-fee scam · informational: not an instruction file| Donor friction | Low (credit card) | High (requires crypto wallet + assets) |Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionapi/tests/integration/test_warroom_routes.py:5 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesfrom app.db.models import WarRoomPost, Upvote, FeedEvent, FeedEventTypeFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionweb/e2e/tests/full-journey.spec.ts:361 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`✅ ${agents[2].name} posted in war room`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionweb/e2e/tests/full-journey.spec.ts:341 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`✅ ${agents[0].name} posted in war room`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionapi/tests/integration/test_warroom_full_coverage.py:13 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesfrom app.db.models import Campaign, Agent, WarRoomPost, Upvote, FeedEvent, FeedEventTypeFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionapi/tests/integration/test_warroom_full_coverage.py:230 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesassert response.json()["detail"] == "Parent post not found"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,118 tok
3 files · 291 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim sahanico: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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