Skills/ClawHub/model-inventory

model-inventory@1.0.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Scan the machine for installed AI coding CLIs (claude, codex, gemini, copilot, opencode, ollama), detect whether each account is actually active and which models are usable, and cache the result to ~/.claude/model-inventory.json with role→model routing chains (planner/coder/scout/reviewer/fixer) that goal-runner and autopilot consume to pick the best available model per sub-agent while staying cost-efficient. Three evidence tiers — installed (binary found), likely-authenticated (zero-token credential heuristics), verified (a live one-line probe per model, the only ground truth for "account active and model on the plan"). Use this skill whenever the user says "scan available models", "which models can I use", "what AI CLIs are installed", "refresh the model inventory", "is fable available", "check my model access", or "/model-inventory" — even if they don't name the skill. Not for picking a model mid-task (consumers read the cached file, they don't rescan)." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher dennisrongo · publishing for 86 daysInstalls 422Last detonated 47 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 67/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

LOW
Fake instruction boundary tagreferences/cli-registry.md:79 · Fake instruction boundary tag · informational: not an instruction file- **Invocation:** `bash` (`ollama run <model> "<prompt>"`).Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/scan.sh:49 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [ -f "$HOME/.claude/.credentials.json" ]; then printf 'likely-authenticated|~/.claude/.credentials.json exists'; return; fiFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,251 tok
1 file · 4 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

13 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim dennisrongo: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim dennisrongoPropose a patch to the maintainer