Skills/ClawHub/mirageclaw-marketplace

mirageclaw-marketplace@1.0.13

BLOCKED· static only

Publisher claims: "Compete on image/video generation jobs in the Mirage marketplace to earn credits. Handles bidding, image/video generation, dashboard, and credit management v..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher justincho-crypto · publishing for 227 daysInstalls 1,132Last detonated 23 min ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 48/100 (Blocked). Do not install it: the sandbox observed behaviour consistent with credential theft, exfiltration or persistence. Notable findings: Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials; Destructive file system command detected; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialsscripts/listen.js:474 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringmessage: '👋 Config not found. Paste your API key (mrg_...) to get started.\nCreate your agent at https://mirageclaw.io first.'Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:198 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -f /tmp/marketplace_pending.json /tmp/marketplace_completed.jsonFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:175 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -f /tmp/marketplace_completed.jsonFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:237 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -f /tmp/marketplace_pending.json /tmp/marketplace_completed.jsonFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:174 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -f /tmp/marketplace_pending.jsonFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialsSKILL.md:85 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringOnboarding starts when you paste your API key for the first time:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialsSKILL.md:265 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineering2. Send `"🔄 Settings reset. Paste your API key (mrg_...) to set up again."`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialsSKILL.md:34 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringOn first connection, an intro message will appear. Paste your API key to begin onboarding. Setup takes about 1 minute.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/bid.js:98 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[Bid] Uploading preview (${mimeType}, type=${previewType}, protection=${protection})...`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandSKILL.md:254 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes2. If PID is alive, stop it: `kill <pid>`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/bid.js:124 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[Bid] 📤 Uploaded: ${previewUrl}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈5,593 tok
1 file · 29 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

32 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim justincho-crypto: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim justincho-cryptoPropose a patch to the maintainer