Skills/ClawHub/mercator-address-evidence

mercator-address-evidence@1.0.3

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Before you send a transaction, check that the chain and contract address you are about to use is the one the entity publishes for that purpose. Not a scam or rug assessment - provenance. You supply the entity, the chain, the candidate address and what you believe it is for. The answer says whether the entity's own published deployment record states that exact address, whether its own on-chain registry still points at it, and what the entity's own source says the contract does - each with the URL and a verbatim excerpt - plus a derived transact true/false. Disagreeing sources return no address at all. Covered eight protocol-and-chain cases when measured on 2026-11-21 (Lido, Aave V3, SparkLend, Uniswap V3 pool creation, ether.fi, Morpho Blue); the free preflight lists what is covered now and says whether yours is. $0.25 USDC per call over x402 on Base, charged once and only when the target is verified. Every other answer is returned in full as HTTP 404, and THIS ONE HOLDS: the x402 middleware cancels settlement on any status of 400 or above, so nothing is captured for it. You pay from your own wallet — see "Who pays" below. Triggers: "is this the official contract for X", "verify this address before I trade", "did X publish this address", "which chain is this contract on and who says it's theirs"." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher arzuo · publishing for 52 daysInstalls 495Last detonated 38 min ago
$clawhub install mercator-address-evidence
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What changed since 1.0.1

vet-skills diff mercator-address-evidence 1.0.1 1.0.3

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.0.1 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

No findings across 381 lines in 2 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,830 tok
1 file · 2 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.