Skills/ClawHub/memvault

memvault@1.0.3

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Production-ready long-term memory server for AI agents with Ebbinghaus decay and strength-weighted retrieval. Use when you need persistent memory across agen..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher wjy9902 · publishing for 261 daysInstalls 1,327Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 50/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Pipe-to-shell pattern; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/install.sh:61 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileswarn "⚠️ No local LLM. Set MEMVAULT_LLM_BASE_URL in .env to use OpenAI/Groq/etc."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/install.sh:40 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -fsSL https://ollama.com/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmemvault_server.py:31 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# ========== Configuration (from env or .env file) ==========Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/install.sh:37 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileswarn "Or set MEMVAULT_LLM_BASE_URL to an OpenAI-compatible endpoint in .env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:55 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesAll via environment variables in `.env` (created by install script):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/install.sh:64 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# ── 3. Create .env ──Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Fake instruction boundary tagSKILL.md:74 · Fake instruction boundary tagmemvault memorize-text "<user_id>" "<content>" "<context>"Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/install.sh:67 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescat > "$SKILL_DIR/.env" << ENVEOFFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/install.sh:40 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -fsSL https://ollama.com/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/install.sh:105 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$SKILL_DIR/scripts/memvault.sh"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile.txt:10 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/install.sh:66 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [[ ! -f "$SKILL_DIR/.env" ]]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈799 tok
1 file · 10 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

30 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim wjy9902: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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