memoryguard@1.0.2
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Local-first MCP memory backend and governance console for coding agents. Auto-organize, quarantine, supersede, and rollback shared memories across multiple a..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: AWS access key pattern detected; Destructive file system command detected; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
quarantined = ['DEMO_TOKEN_not_real_123', 'AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE', 'sk-1234567890abcdef']Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.p = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "memoryguard.mcp_server"], input=stdin, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.errors.append("memory.md missing after install")Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.positive_example = "脚本含 rm -rf / curl | sh subprocess.call(shell=True)"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.its native memory. Add this to your `AGENTS.md` - either the project-levelFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.positive_example = "脚本含 rm -rf / curl | sh subprocess.call(shell=True)"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.positive_example = "脚本含 rm -rf / curl | sh subprocess.call(shell=True)"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.suggestion=f"移除 {label},或移到 .env 并在文档中引用变量名",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.if any(k in lower_path for k in (".env", "secret", "credential", "token", "key")):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.p2 = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "memoryguard.mcp_server"], input=stdin2, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.## Step 3: Add the CLAUDE.md instructionFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.## Step 3: Add the AGENTS.md instructionFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.包含疑似密钥: AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLEFix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.p = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "memoryguard.mcp_server"], input=stdin, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.positive_example = "脚本含 rm -rf / curl | sh subprocess.call(shell=True)"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.…!==u.length?a.push({ele:u,json:s}):n?(s.group=n,r.push(s)):r.push(s)}else Ve("cy.json() cannot handle elements without an ID attribute")}t.add(r);for(var c=0;c<a.length;c++){var d=a[c],h=d.ele,p=d.json;h.json(p)}};if(v(e.elements))a(e.elem…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.…v=u[g],y=this.calculateLabelDimensions(e,v).width;if(d){var m=v.split("").join("");v=m}if(y>c){for(var b=v.split(p),x="",w=0;w<b.length;w++){var E=b[w],k=0===x.…Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.positive_example = "脚本含 rm -rf / curl | sh subprocess.call(shell=True)"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.self._proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.original_content="AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE",Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim irisxc4: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- AWS access key pattern detected≈ +4 on the totalNever read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.