Skills/ClawHub/mediator

mediator@1.0.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Intercept and filter communications from difficult contacts. Strips emotion, extracts facts, drafts neutral responses. Use when setting up communication filtering for specific contacts, configuring the mediator, or processing intercepted messages. Triggers on "mediator", "intercept messages", "filter communications", "difficult contact", or requests to handle messages from someone the user doesn't want to deal with directly." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher dylntrnr · publishing for 280 daysInstalls 2,169Last detonated 17 min ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 54/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: OS command execution function call detected; OS command execution function call detected; OS command execution function call detected. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

CRITICAL
OS command execution function call detectedscripts/config-helper.py:13 · OS command execution function call detectedos.system(f"{sys.executable} -m pip install -q pyyaml")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/process-imessage.py:68 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
CRITICAL
OS command execution function call detectedscripts/process-email.py:17 · OS command execution function call detectedos.system(f"{sys.executable} -m pip install -q pyyaml")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/process-email.py:73 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/summarize.py:83 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
CRITICAL
OS command execution function call detectedscripts/process-imessage.py:17 · OS command execution function call detectedos.system(f"{sys.executable} -m pip install -q pyyaml")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/process-email.py:99 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/process-email.py:131 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/process-imessage.py:93 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,148 tok
1 file · 8 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

26 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim dylntrnr: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim dylntrnrPropose a patch to the maintainer