magicbrowse@0.1.19
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Browser automation fallback through the magicbrowse CLI with goal-driven act as the default primitive and observe/primitives only for recovery, with changed page state verified by fresh observation." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
### `magicbrowse act "<prompt>" [--max-steps <n>] [--use-vision] [--format <fmt>]`Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.No other findings across 1,147 lines in 7 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.