mac-multi-user-agents@1.1.0
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Configure a powerful macOS machine to host multiple dedicated OpenClaw agent users with Fast User Switching, a shared Homebrew toolchain, per-user OpenClaw h..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 6 of 6 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
$( [ "$ADMIN" = "yes" ] && echo "sudo dseditgroup -o edit -a \"$USER_NAME\" -t user admin" || echo "# no admin promotion requested" )Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo sysadminctl -addUser "$USER_NAME" -fullName "$FULL_NAME" -shell "$SHELL_PATH" -password -Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.echo "sudo -u \"$USER_NAME\" /bin/zsh -lc 'grep -q /opt/homebrew/bin ~/.zprofile 2>/dev/null || printf \"\\nexport PATH=/opt/homebrew/bin:/opt/homebrew/sbin:\\$PATH\\n\" >> ~/.zprofile'"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.echo "sudo dseditgroup -o edit -a \"$USER_NAME\" -t user admin"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.create_cmd=(sudo sysadminctl -addUser "$USER_NAME" -fullName "$FULL_NAME" -shell "$SHELL_PATH" -password "$PASSWORD")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.echo "sudo -u \"$USER_NAME\" chmod 700 \"/Users/$USER_NAME/.ssh\""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo -u "$USER_NAME" mkdir -p "/Users/$USER_NAME/.ssh" "/Users/$USER_NAME/.openclaw"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo -u "$USER_NAME" chmod 700 "/Users/$USER_NAME/.ssh"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.echo "sudo -u \"$USER_NAME\" mkdir -p \"/Users/$USER_NAME/.ssh\" \"/Users/$USER_NAME/.openclaw\""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.- one `~/.ssh` per agentFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- `~/.ssh`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.It does not try to hide the fact that macOS user management still requires admin access.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.- admin access on the MacFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.echo "Run as $TARGET_USER or with sudo to verify command lookup inside that user shell."Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.sudo -u "$USER_NAME" chmod 700 "/Users/$USER_NAME/.ssh"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.sudo -u "$USER_NAME" /bin/zsh -lc 'grep -q /opt/homebrew/bin ~/.zprofile 2>/dev/null || printf "\\nexport PATH=/opt/homebrew/bin:/opt/homebrew/sbin:\\$PATH\\n" >> ~/.zprofile'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.echo "sudo -u \"$USER_NAME\" chmod 700 \"/Users/$USER_NAME/.ssh\""Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.sudo -u "$USER_NAME" chmod 700 "/Users/$USER_NAME/.ssh"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.