Skills/ClawHub/mac-multi-user-agents

mac-multi-user-agents@1.1.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Configure a powerful macOS machine to host multiple dedicated OpenClaw agent users with Fast User Switching, a shared Homebrew toolchain, per-user OpenClaw h..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher matthewxmurphy · publishing for 259 daysInstalls 1,291Last detonated 1 h ago
$clawhub install mac-multi-user-agents
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
6 of 6 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.0sprocessexited 1: missing required arguments
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/hostname
0.0sprocessexited 127: ./scripts/detect-host.sh: line 8: sw_vers: command not found
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 127: ./scripts/recommend-layout.sh: line 4: sysctl: command not found
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: missing --user or --full-name
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: missing --user
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/hostname
0.1sprocessexited 1: usage: write-receipt.sh --action NAME --status STATUS [--detail TEXT] [--target NAME] [--root DIR]
0.1sprocess6 of 6 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/render-user-create.sh:36 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges$( [ "$ADMIN" = "yes" ] && echo "sudo dseditgroup -o edit -a \"$USER_NAME\" -t user admin" || echo "# no admin promotion requested" )Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/render-user-create.sh:33 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo sysadminctl -addUser "$USER_NAME" -fullName "$FULL_NAME" -shell "$SHELL_PATH" -password -Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/create-user.sh:56 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho "sudo -u \"$USER_NAME\" /bin/zsh -lc 'grep -q /opt/homebrew/bin ~/.zprofile 2>/dev/null || printf \"\\nexport PATH=/opt/homebrew/bin:/opt/homebrew/sbin:\\$PATH\\n\" >> ~/.zprofile'"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/create-user.sh:52 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho "sudo dseditgroup -o edit -a \"$USER_NAME\" -t user admin"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/create-user.sh:46 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegescreate_cmd=(sudo sysadminctl -addUser "$USER_NAME" -fullName "$FULL_NAME" -shell "$SHELL_PATH" -password "$PASSWORD")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/create-user.sh:55 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho "sudo -u \"$USER_NAME\" chmod 700 \"/Users/$USER_NAME/.ssh\""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/render-user-create.sh:39 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo -u "$USER_NAME" mkdir -p "/Users/$USER_NAME/.ssh" "/Users/$USER_NAME/.openclaw"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/render-user-create.sh:40 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo -u "$USER_NAME" chmod 700 "/Users/$USER_NAME/.ssh"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/create-user.sh:54 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho "sudo -u \"$USER_NAME\" mkdir -p \"/Users/$USER_NAME/.ssh\" \"/Users/$USER_NAME/.openclaw\""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:48 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- one `~/.ssh` per agentFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:115 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- `~/.ssh`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageSKILL.md:19 · Authorization escalation languageIt does not try to hide the fact that macOS user management still requires admin access.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageSKILL.md:39 · Authorization escalation language- admin access on the MacFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/verify-user-shell.sh:53 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho "Run as $TARGET_USER or with sudo to verify command lookup inside that user shell."Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/render-user-create.sh:40 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionssudo -u "$USER_NAME" chmod 700 "/Users/$USER_NAME/.ssh"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/render-user-create.sh:43 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo -u "$USER_NAME" /bin/zsh -lc 'grep -q /opt/homebrew/bin ~/.zprofile 2>/dev/null || printf "\\nexport PATH=/opt/homebrew/bin:/opt/homebrew/sbin:\\$PATH\\n" >> ~/.zprofile'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/create-user.sh:55 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsecho "sudo -u \"$USER_NAME\" chmod 700 \"/Users/$USER_NAME/.ssh\""Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/create-user.sh:67 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionssudo -u "$USER_NAME" chmod 700 "/Users/$USER_NAME/.ssh"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,369 tok
1 file · 11 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.