Skills/ClawHub/lygo-guardian-p0-stack

lygo-guardian-p0-stack@1.0.1

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Portable LYGO Guardian — P0.4 text gate, P0.5 understanding heart, harmony layer. Bridge to repo byte_entropy_filter via LYGO_STACK_ROOT. Pairs with lygo-pro..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher deepseekoracle · publishing for 154 daysInstalls 2,119Last detonated 2d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 66/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/guardian/p0_4_gate.py:6 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"self_harm": re.compile(r"(kill myself|end my life|suicide)", re.I),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languagereferences/SECURITY.md:21 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction fileFor **full lattice** install `lygo-protocol-stack-operator` separately with user review. This skill is a **lightweight guard**, not stack root access.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/guardian/p0_4_gate.py:7 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"violence": re.compile(r"(kill them|murder|bomb|shoot)", re.I),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/run_byte_gate.py:26 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.call([sys.executable, str(gate), str(path)])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:17 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeInstall: `npx clawhub@latest install deepseekoracle/lygo-guardian-p0-stack`Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈887 tok
1 file · 15 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

14 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim deepseekoracle: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim deepseekoraclePropose a patch to the maintainer