lobster-continuous-learning-v2@1.0.0
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "Instinct-based learning system that observes sessions via hooks, creates atomic instincts with confidence scoring, and evolves them into skills/commands/agen..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 63/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
if kill -0 "$claude_pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.kill "$watchdog_pid" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.[ -n "$SLEEP_PID" ] && kill "$SLEEP_PID" 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.[ -n "$SLEEP_PID" ] && kill "$SLEEP_PID" 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.kill "$claude_pid" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell._spec.loader.exec_module(_mod)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell._validate_file_path("/etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.if kill -0 "$pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if kill -0 "$pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.kill "$pid"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if kill -0 "$pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.kill -USR1 "$observer_pid" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if kill -0 "$pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell._mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(_spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if kill -0 "$pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if kill -0 "$observer_pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
17 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim wangxiaofei860208-source: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Dynamic module loading≈ +1 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.