Skills/ClawHub/lobster-continuous-learning-v2

lobster-continuous-learning-v2@1.0.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Instinct-based learning system that observes sessions via hooks, creates atomic instincts with confidence scoring, and evolves them into skills/commands/agen..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher wangxiaofei860208-source · publishing for 229 daysInstalls 752Last detonated 5 h ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 63/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commandagents/observer-loop.sh:202 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif kill -0 "$claude_pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandagents/observer-loop.sh:211 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill "$watchdog_pid" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandagents/observer-loop.sh:22 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes[ -n "$SLEEP_PID" ] && kill "$SLEEP_PID" 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/instinct-cli.py:140 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/instinct-cli.py:171 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandagents/observer-loop.sh:226 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes[ -n "$SLEEP_PID" ] && kill "$SLEEP_PID" 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandagents/observer-loop.sh:204 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill "$claude_pid" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Dynamic module loadingscripts/test_parse_instinct.py:32 · Dynamic module loading (importlib.loader.exec_module via provenance)_spec.loader.exec_module(_mod)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/test_parse_instinct.py:290 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files_validate_file_path("/etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandhooks/observe.sh:302 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif kill -0 "$pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandagents/start-observer.sh:227 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif kill -0 "$pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandagents/start-observer.sh:60 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill "$pid"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandagents/start-observer.sh:151 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif kill -0 "$pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandhooks/observe.sh:421 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -USR1 "$observer_pid" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandagents/start-observer.sh:58 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif kill -0 "$pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Dynamic module loadingscripts/test_parse_instinct.py:31 · Dynamic module loading_mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(_spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandagents/start-observer.sh:181 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif kill -0 "$pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandhooks/observe.sh:420 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif kill -0 "$observer_pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,138 tok
1 file · 11 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

17 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim wangxiaofei860208-source: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Dynamic module loading≈ +1 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim wangxiaofei860208-sourcePropose a patch to the maintainer