linkfox-shopee-store-orders@1.0.6
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Shopee（虾皮）店铺订单（与 linkfox-shopee-store-auth 同系列），经 /shopee/developerProxy 转发 Shopee Open API Order 模块全部 22 个接口：get_order_list、get_order_detail、get_shipment_list、search_package_list、cancel_order、ship 相关 booking/invoice/FBS 等。当用户提到 Shopee 订单、虾皮订单列表、订单详情、包裹、拆单、取消订单、买家取消、订单备注、booking、FBS 发票、order_sn、READY_TO_SHIP、Shopee order processing 时触发。即使未明确提及"订单"，只要涉及已授权 Shopee 店铺的订单查询或订单处理，也应触发。" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-06 and scored it 92/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.No other findings across 3,831 lines in 54 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.