Skills/ClawHub/linkedin-pipedream

linkedin-pipedream@1.0.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Post to LinkedIn, comment, like, search organizations, and manage profiles via Pipedream OAuth integration." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher g9pedro · publishing for 288 daysInstalls 2,680Last detonated 1 h ago
$clawhub install linkedin-pipedream
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.1sprocess1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Authorization escalation languageSKILL.md:347 · Authorization escalation language3. **Org Posting:** Always verify admin access before attempting org posts.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionorg-post.mjs:56 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log('\n✅ Posted successfully!');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
LOW
Authorization escalation languageskill-card.md:34 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction fileMitigation: Verify organization admin access and OAuth status before using the helper, and keep credentials in the pdauth configuration rather than source files.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:224 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log('Posted!', result);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageSKILL.md:302 · Authorization escalation language# Check if you have admin access (for orgs you manage)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageSKILL.md:160 · Authorization escalation language### 8. Check Organization Admin AccessFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionorg-post.mjs:41 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`📝 Posting to organization ${orgId}...`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,725 tok
1 file · 3 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.