Skills/ClawHub/linkedin-content

linkedin-content@0.2.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Draft LinkedIn posts every week from your own proof points: each Monday three post drafts for one author land in your go-to-market repo as one pull request, built only from what context/ and the cadence log already say, each with its hook and the files it draws on; nothing is ever published. Triggers: "draft our founder's LinkedIn posts every week", "weekly LinkedIn drafts from our proof points", "turn our wins and insights into LinkedIn posts", "keep a LinkedIn content pipeline", "ghostwrite LinkedIn posts from our context", "content calendar for the CEO on LinkedIn". Cargo project, defineAgent, harness claudeCode, GitHub, context/, cadence/content. Skip when: you want the company website and news read into context/, which is web-capture; or you want one post written now, in this chat, with nothing deployed." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher cargo-ai · publishing for 258 daysInstalls 362Last detonated 24 min ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

What changed since 0.1.2

vet-skills diff linkedin-content 0.1.2 0.2.0

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.1.2 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

0.2.0 was not run in the sandbox (static only); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 66/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Text pushed off-screen by whitespace. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Text pushed off-screen by whitespaceSKILL.md:128 · Text pushed off-screen by whitespace| A run before `web-capture`'s Monday run drafts from last week's web findings. |Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

No other findings across 724 lines in 11 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,766 tok
1 file · 11 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

14 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim cargo-ai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
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