li-codeql-llm@1.0.0
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "CodeQL 安全扫描与 LLM 智能分析融合工具。自动检测 CodeQL 安装、扫描指定目录、生成漏洞报告、LLM 分析、Jenkins 集成、输出验证 Checklist。" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
echo -e "${GREEN}✓ 加载配置文件 / Loading .env configuration${NC}"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Load .env file and provide configuration accessFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.print("💡 请在 .env 文件中设置 JENKINS_TOKEN")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.print("🔍 检查 .env 配置...")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.env_file: .env 文件路径,默认当前目录的 .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.\ os\n\ndef download(path): \n os.system(\"wget \" + path) # NOT OK\n\n```\n\Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."""检查 .env 中的 Token 配置"""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.In the first example, a file name is read from an HTTP request and then used to access a file. However, a malicious user could enter a file name that is an absolute path, such as `"/etc/passwd"`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.print(" 2. 更新 .env 文件")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.3. 命令注入 - 行 88 - 利用:`; cat /etc/passwd`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.\ os\n\ndef download(path): \n os.system(\"wget \" + path) # NOT OK\n\n```\n\Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if [ -f ".env" ]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.print(f" 7. 更新 .env 文件:JENKINS_TOKEN=<your-token>")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.self.env_file = env_file or '.env'Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.加载 .env 文件并提供配置访问Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.config_file = Path('.env')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.\ os\n\ndef download(path): \n os.system(\"wget \" + path) # NOT OK\n\n```\n\Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.\ os\n\ndef download(path): \n os.system(\"wget \" + path) # NOT OK\n\n```\n\Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.https://github.com/github/codeql-cli-binaries/releases/latest/download/codeql-linux64.zipFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.# 加载 .env 配置 / Load .env configurationFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.\ os\n\ndef download(path): \n os.system(\"wget \" + path) # NOT OK\n\n```\n\Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.…er a file name containing special characters. For example, the string `"../../../etc/passwd"` will result in the code reading the file located at `"/server/static/images/.…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.In the first example, a file name is read from an HTTP request and then used to access a file. However, a malicious user could enter a file name that is an absolute path, such as `"/etc/passwd"`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.call(["application", COMMANDS[action]])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.with open(skill_dir / ".env") as f:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.call(["application", action])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(curl_cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=60)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.if [ -f ".env" ]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.config_file = Path('.env')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.echo -e "${GREEN}✓ .env 文件存在${NC}"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.\ by a shell:\n\n\n```python\nimport subprocess\n\ndef download(path): \n subprocess.run([\"\Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.In the first example, a file name is read from an HTTP request and then used to access a file. However, a malicious user could enter a file name that is an absolute path, such as `"/etc/passwd"`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.…er a file name containing special characters. For example, the string `"../../../etc/passwd"` will result in the code reading the file located at `"/server/static/images/.…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.… takes a shell script that can be changed by a user, and passes it straight to `subprocess.call()` without examining it first. The second is safe as it selects the command from…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.…er a file name containing special characters. For example, the string `"../../../etc/passwd"` will result in the code reading the file located at `"/server/static/images/.…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.…rbitrary code on the server. For example, the user could supply the value `"' + subprocess.call('rm -rf') + '"` to destroy the server's file system. The second function calls t…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.call(["application", COMMANDS[action]])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.… takes a shell script that can be changed by a user, and passes it straight to `subprocess.call()` without examining it first. The second is safe as it selects the command from…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.grep -E "^JENKINS_URL=|^JENKINS_USER=|^JENKINS_SCAN_TARGET=|^CODEQL_LANGUAGE=" .env | sed 's/^/ /'Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.In the first example, a file name is read from an HTTP request and then used to access a file. However, a malicious user could enter a file name that is an absolute path, such as `"/etc/passwd"`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.…er a file name containing special characters. For example, the string `"../../../etc/passwd"` will result in the code reading the file located at `"/server/static/images/.…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.run(["xdg-open", file_path], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.echo -e "${YELLOW}[1/5] 检查 .env 配置...${NC}"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.…er a file name containing special characters. For example, the string `"../../../etc/passwd"` will result in the code reading the file located at `"/server/static/images/.…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.source .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.In the first example, a file name is read from an HTTP request and then used to access a file. However, a malicious user could enter a file name that is an absolute path, such as `"/etc/passwd"`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# 1. 检查 .env 配置Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.call(["application", action])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.call(["application", action])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.… takes a shell script that can be changed by a user, and passes it straight to `subprocess.call()` without examining it first. The second is safe as it selects the command from…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.\ by a shell:\n\n\n```python\nimport subprocess\n\ndef download(path): \n subprocess.run([\"\Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.call(["application", COMMANDS[action]])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.call(["application", action])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.…rbitrary code on the server. For example, the user could supply the value `"' + subprocess.call('rm -rf') + '"` to destroy the server's file system. The second function calls t…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.call(["application", COMMANDS[action]])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.… takes a shell script that can be changed by a user, and passes it straight to `subprocess.call()` without examining it first. The second is safe as it selects the command from…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.\ by a shell:\n\n\n```python\nimport subprocess\n\ndef download(path): \n subprocess.run([\"\Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.\ by a shell:\n\n\n```python\nimport subprocess\n\ndef download(path): \n subprocess.run([\"\Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.…rbitrary code on the server. For example, the user could supply the value `"' + subprocess.call('rm -rf') + '"` to destroy the server's file system. The second function calls t…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.call(["application", action])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.call(["application", COMMANDS[action]])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.… takes a shell script that can be changed by a user, and passes it straight to `subprocess.call()` without examining it first. The second is safe as it selects the command from…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.…rbitrary code on the server. For example, the user could supply the value `"' + subprocess.call('rm -rf') + '"` to destroy the server's file system. The second function calls t…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.\ by a shell:\n\n\n```python\nimport subprocess\n\ndef download(path): \n subprocess.run([\"\Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.…rbitrary code on the server. For example, the user could supply the value `"' + subprocess.call('rm -rf') + '"` to destroy the server's file system. The second function calls t…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim 43622283: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- README links to an external installer≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.