leio-sdlc@1.0.0
BLOCKED· static onlyPublisher claims: "强制指令:执行 Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC)。所有的代码修改、Bug 修复和功能实现,必须且只能通过启动本技能中的 orchestrator.py 来完成。严禁主 Agent (你) 绕过本技能直接去操作源码工作区。" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 45/100 (Blocked). Do not install it: the sandbox observed behaviour consistent with credential theft, exfiltration or persistence. Notable findings: OS command execution function call detected; OS command execution function call detected; OS command execution function call detected. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
os.system("git add . && git commit -m 'changes' >/dev/null 2>&1")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.os.system("git add . && git commit -m 'clean' >/dev/null 2>&1")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.os.system(f"git merge {args.branch} -m 'Merge' >/dev/null 2>&1")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.os.system("git add . && git commit -m 'clean' >/dev/null 2>&1")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.os.system("git commit -m 'feat'")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.rm -f /root/.openclaw/workspace/tests/tool_calls.logFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.os.system("git add preflight.sh && git commit -m 'add preflight'")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.os.system("git add preflight.sh && git commit -m 'add preflight'")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.os.system("git add feature.txt")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.os.system("git add . && git commit -m 'changes' >/dev/null 2>&1")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.os.system("echo 'changes' > dummy.txt")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.rm /tmp/intercepted_prompt.logFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.rm -f /root/.openclaw/workspace/tests/tool_calls.logFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.rm -f /root/.openclaw/workspace/tests/tool_calls.logFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.os.system("git add . && git commit -m 'clean' >/dev/null 2>&1")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.rm -f /root/.openclaw/workspace/tests/tool_calls.logFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.os.system("git add . && git commit -m 'clean' >/dev/null 2>&1")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.os.system("git add . && git commit -m 'clean' >/dev/null 2>&1")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.os.system("echo 'changes' > dummy.txt")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.rm -f /root/.openclaw/workspace/tests/tool_calls.logFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.rm /tmp/intercepted_prompt.logFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.os.system("git add hello.py && git commit -m 'feat: init hello.py'")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.chmod +x "$SANDBOX_DIR/bin/openclaw"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "add"] + valid_files, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.chmod +x scripts/spawn_reviewer.pyFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod +x scripts/spawn_planner.pyFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod +x scripts/spawn_coder.pyFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.subprocess.run(["git", "merge", "--abort"], check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.chmod +x "bin/openclaw"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod +x scripts/merge_code.pyFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod +x scripts/spawn_coder.pyFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.# subprocess.run(["git", "-c", "sdlc.runtime=1", "commit", "-m", f"chore(state): update PR state to {new_status}"], check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.chmod +x ~/.openclaw/skills/leio-github-sync/scripts/sync.pyFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.return subprocess.Popen(cmd, **kwargs)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.chmod +x "bin/openclaw"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod +x scripts/spawn_planner.pyFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.subprocess.run(["git", "-c", "sdlc.runtime=1", "commit", "-m", "chore(state): update manager state"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc2 = subprocess.run(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True, env=env)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.echo "ERROR: tests/tool_calls.log does not contain expected output."Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.You MUST NOT blindly guess where to save the PRD. You MUST follow these exact steps:Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.result = subprocess.run(cmd, check=True, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc1 = subprocess.Popen(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True, env=env)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.chmod +x "$WORK_DIR/preflight.sh"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.git_root = subprocess.check_output(["git", "rev-parse", "--show-toplevel"], text=True).strip()Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "commit", "--allow-empty", "-m", "Baseline commit"], cwd=target_dir, check=True, capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(["git", "-c", "sdlc.runtime=1", "merge", branch], check=True, text=True, capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.chmod +x "$TEMP_DIR/bin/openclaw"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.subprocess.run(["git", "init"], cwd=target_dir, check=True, capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.chmod +x ~/.openclaw/skills/leio-github-sync/scripts/sync.pyFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod +x scripts/spawn_coder.pyFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.toplevel = subprocess.run(["git", "rev-parse", "--show-toplevel"], capture_output=True, text=True, cwd=workdir).stdout.strip()Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.kill $ORCH_PID || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.chmod +x "bin/openclaw"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod +x "$TARGET_DIR/hooks/pre-commit"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod +x scripts/openclawFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.# We need a background process that we can kill after handshake becauseFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.chmod +x "$TEST_DIR/bin/openclaw"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.rm -f /tmp/coder_runs.logFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.chmod +x "$TEMP_DIR/bin/openclaw"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod +x "$TMP_SCRIPTS/spawn_coder.py"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.head_res = subprocess.run(["git", "rev-parse", "HEAD"], cwd=workdir, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.chmod +x scripts/spawn_arbitrator.pyFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod +x dummy_workspace/bin/openclawFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod +x scripts/spawn_reviewer.pyFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod +x scripts/*.pyFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.# subprocess.run(["git", "add", pr_file], check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(cmd, **kwargs)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(diff_cmd, shell=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.os.system(f"git init {workdir}")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.res = subprocess.run(["bash", deploy_script, "--no-restart"], env=env, cwd=self.project_root, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "checkout", "-b", "feature/toxic_branch"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.chmod +x scripts/*.pyFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.res2 = subprocess.run(["bash", deploy_script, "--no-restart"], env=env, cwd=self.project_root, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(diff_cmd, shell=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.…ot/.openclaw/workspace/projects/leio-sdlc/scripts/orchestrator.py" result = subprocess.run(["python3", orchestrator_script, "--enable-exec-from-workspace", "--workdir", st…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.out = subprocess.run(["git", "log", "--oneline"], cwd=tmpdir, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "commit", "-m", "scaffold"], cwd=str(workdir))Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "commit", "--allow-empty", "-m", "init"], cwd=str(workdir))Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "config", "user.name", "Test"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.parser.add_argument("--out-file", default="uat_report.json", help="Path to output JSON")Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.subprocess.run(["git", "commit", "--allow-empty", "-m", "init"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res2 = subprocess.run(["bash", deploy_script, "--no-restart"], env=env, cwd=self.project_root, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run([Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.kill $PID || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.chmod +x fake_bin/gitFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.kill $PID || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.run(history_cmd, shell=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, env=env, cwd=self.temp_dir)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.chmod +x "$TEST_HOOK"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.chmod +x "$MOCK_SKILL_SRC/deploy.sh" "$MOCK_SKILL_SRC/rollback.sh"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.subprocess.run(["git", "init"])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=workdir, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Run orchestrator in a sub-process so we can kill it after checking the lockFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.run(["git", "init"])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.chmod +x "$TEST_DIR/scripts/"*.pyFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod +x "$TEMP_DIR/bin/openclaw"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.… # We will invoke orchestrator directly and check stderr/stdout res = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(orch_script), "--workdir", str(workdir), "--prd-file", "PRD…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "add", "."], cwd=str(workdir))Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(["python3", script_path, "--files", "main.py"], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["bash", "kit-deploy.sh"], cwd=tempdir, env=env, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "init"])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, "-c", "import time; time.sleep(10)"], start_new_session=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.chmod +x "$SANDBOX_DIR/bin/openclaw"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.res = subprocess.run(cmd_handshake, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.branch = subprocess.check_output(["git", "rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"], stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, text=True).strip()Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res1 = subprocess.run(["bash", deploy_script, "--no-restart"], env=env, cwd=self.project_root, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.os.system(f"git init {workdir}")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.res = subprocess.run(["bash", deploy_script, "--no-restart"], env=env, cwd=self.project_root, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(doctor_script), str(target), "--fix", "--enforce-git-lock"], capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res1 = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(doctor_script), str(workdir), "--fix"], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run([Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.chmod +x scripts/*.pyFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.subprocess.run(["git", "init"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "config", "user.email", "[email protected]"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res1 = subprocess.run(["bash", deploy_script, "--no-restart"], env=env, cwd=self.project_root, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, "-c", "import time; time.sleep(10)"], start_new_session=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.…ation Rule**: The Manager MUST append the following instruction to the Coder: *"You must execute `./preflight.sh` yourself in your sandbox. If it fails, you must fix it. Do NOT…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.proc = subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, test_script], stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc1 = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc2 = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, env=env)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(["bash", script_path, "--no-restart"], env=env, cwd=repo_root, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.…er generates a `Review_Report.md` containing `[ACTION_REQUIRED]`, do NOT merge. You must execute a Correction Loop: run the Coder Revision command, then run the Reviewer comman…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.…ANAGER]\nStartup validation failed (likely executing from the wrong directory). You MUST execute the script using its absolute installed path (e.g., `python3 ~/.openclaw/skills…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, env=env)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(["bash", deploy_script], env=env, cwd=repo_root, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.…ANAGER]\nStartup validation failed (likely executing from the wrong directory). You MUST execute the script using its absolute installed path (e.g., `python3 ~/.openclaw/skills…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.res = subprocess.run(["bash", deploy_script], env=env, cwd=repo_root, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
35 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim leio9511: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.