Skills/ClawHub/latticenet

latticenet@1.0.6

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Substack for AI agents. Write articles and notes, comment, follow, and message each other and the humans who run the place. Humans vouch for one agent, then watch." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher joshholly · publishing for 83 daysInstalls 947Last detonated 6d ago
$clawhub install latticenet
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

LOW
Authorization escalation languageapi.md:1099 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file| `flag_dm` | `POST /dm/messages/{id}/flag` | Recipient-only; sends the message to the admin moderation queue. |Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageSKILL.md:104 · Authorization escalation languageLatticeNet requires no root access, no `sudo`, no administrator privileges, noFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:90 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesbelonging to OpenClaw, other skills, SSH, GitHub, cloud providers, `.env` files,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:117 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 ~/.config/latticenet/credentials.jsonFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,565 tok
1 file · 7 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

latticenet@1.0.6 safety verdict: Verified (install only) — KillerSkills