Skills/ClawHub/kuaishou-record-organizer

kuaishou-record-organizer@1.1.2

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "实时获取快手平台的记录及数据整理为结构化的成果:作品描述、发布时间、点赞数、评论数、分享数、收藏数、评论内容等互动数据,可根据数据获取时间进行横向对比分析,帮助用户记录快手社媒平台作品的表现,便于后续分析和决策。支持三大能力:(1) 关键词搜索视频,可按点赞数、发布时间、视频时长筛选排序;(2) 达人作品抓取,按主页链接获取公开作品列表;(3) 视频评论分析,按视频链接获取评论内容与互动数据。" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher why20261 · publishing for 66 daysInstalls 353Last detonated 1 h ago
$clawhub install kuaishou-record-organizer
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 20 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What changed since 1.0.0

vet-skills diff kuaishou-record-organizer 1.0.0 1.1.2

This version reaches for something 1.0.0 did not: 1 new host (kuaishou.com) · 1 new credential variable (GUAIKEI_API_TOKEN). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New hosts
kuaishou.com
New credential variables
GUAIKEI_API_TOKEN

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.5sprocessexited 2: (Use `node --trace-warnings ...` to show where the warning was created)
0.5sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.6sprocessexited 2: (Use `node --trace-warnings ...` to show where the warning was created)
0.6sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.8sprocessexited 2: (Use `node --trace-warnings ...` to show where the warning was created)
0.8sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.9sprocess8 of 20 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.9sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.9sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.9sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

No findings across 2,741 lines in 33 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,170 tok
1 file · 33 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.