Skills/ClawHub/kling-4-prompting

kling-4-prompting@1.0.8

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "How to prompt Kling 4 (Kling 4.0, kling_v4) for cinematic AI video that does not look like AI slop: let a strong image model compose every shot, then give Kling 4 two to four key frames and a short director's prompt. Covers reference-to-video inputs (@Image, @Element, @Video, @Voice), multi-shot prompts with seconds, 30-second takes, dialogue in quotes, "no slow motion", lens and film-look lines, prompts that fail and their rewrites, elements that need two photos, the failure fixes (slow motion by default, six fingers, AI-smooth framing, face drift in close-ups) and the exact varg call with the reference route pinned. Use when someone asks how to prompt Kling 4, why Kling 4 looks worse than Seedance 2.5, how to use Kling 4 reference-to-video, elements, multi_prompt or keyframes, or wants a Kling 4 prompt written. For a whole short film use kling-4-keyframe-film; for a 30-second action montage use kling-4-action-montage." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher vargai · publishing for 215 daysInstalls 373Last detonated 18 h ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 64/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentREADME.md:1 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentGenerated by .github/readme/build.ts from SKILL.md files and .github/readme/*.json. Edit those and run `bun .github/readme/build.ts`; CI fails when this file isFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

No other findings across 526 lines in 5 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,779 tok
1 file · 5 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

16 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim vargai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim vargaiPropose a patch to the maintainer