Skills/ClawHub/keynote-video

keynote-video@2.1.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "PPT/演示文稿 → 播报视频。交互式内容评估 + LLM讲稿生成 + 风格化口语重写 + 方案确认后自动合成。v2.0 架构:LLM管内容,脚本管技术。 支持7种风格:新闻播报/资讯快报/技术汇报/技术培训/故事讲述/商业演讲/轻松闲聊。" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher vincentlau2046-sudo · publishing for 221 daysInstalls 952Last detonated 17 h ago
$clawhub install keynote-video
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
3 of 3 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.0sprocessexited 1: 用法: python3 extract_ppt_text.py <input_file>
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: ❌ 缺少必需参数: --slides <PPT/PDF路径>
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1:
0.1sprocess3 of 3 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/generate.js:556 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`\n📄 完成报告: ${path.join(outputDir, 'VIDEO_COMPLETE.md')}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/generate.js:494 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`📤 输出: ${outputDir}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:308 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get install poppler-utils # pdftoppmFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,547 tok
1 file · 10 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.