Skills/ClawHub/kb-query

kb-query@1.0.8

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Answer Research KB questions from the team Gitea-backed knowledge base with OpenClaw reasoning, optional reference attachments, stable citations, OpenClaw-led evidence selection, and optional high-value Q&A persistence." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher myd2002 · publishing for 153 daysInstalls 1,274Last detonated 2d ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 60/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Hidden zero-width characters detected; Hidden zero-width characters detected; Hidden zero-width characters detected. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedscripts/gitea_api.py:1 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentimport base64Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedsetup.sh:1 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content#!/usr/bin/env bashFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedmain.js:1 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentmodule.exports = {Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedscripts/run_task.py:1 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentimport argparseFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:70 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filespython3 scripts/run_task.py fetch --input <payload.json> --context <context.json> --selection <page-selection.json> --evidence-output <evidence.json>Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedscripts/text_extractors.py:1 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentimport xml.etree.ElementTree as ETFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedscripts/query_context.py:1 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentfrom catalog import catalog_from_raw, visible_catalog_pagesFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/query_context.py:92 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"fetchCommand": "python3 scripts/run_task.py fetch --input <payload.json> --context <context.json> --selection <page-selection.json> --evidence-output <evidence.json>",Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedscripts/catalog.py:1 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentimport jsonFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedscripts/qa_writer.py:11 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsNO_KB_SOURCE_LINE = "- \u77e5\u8bc6\u5e93\u4e2d\u672a\u627e\u5230\u53ef\u652f\u6491\u672c\u95ee\u9898\u7684\u9875\u9762\u3002"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:44 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filespython3 scripts/run_task.py prepare --input <payload.json> --context-output <context.json>Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,681 tok
1 file · 14 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

20 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim myd2002: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
  3. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  4. Unicode escape sequence detected≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
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