Skills/ClawHub/k8s-aiops

k8s-aiops@0.15.0

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "Use this skill whenever the user needs to operate a Kubernetes cluster — list/inspect pods, deployments, statefulsets, daemonsets, replicasets, jobs, cronjobs, services, ingresses, endpoints, configmaps, secrets (names/keys only), PVCs/PVs/storageclasses, nodes, namespaces, and events; read pod logs; describe pods/nodes; pod/node top (metrics); read-only diagnostics / RCA (pod-health, workload-readiness); scale deployments/statefulsets; rollout status/history/undo/pause/resume and set image; delete pods/deployments/jobs; create/delete namespaces; and cordon/uncordon/drain nodes. Works with any kubeconfig-reachable cluster (standard Kubernetes, k3s, EKS, GKE, AKS). Always use this skill for "list k8s pods", "scale deployment", "kubernetes pod logs", "describe pod", "why is my pod crashing", "diagnose pods", "which deployments are unhealthy", "rollout undo", "set image", "top pods", "drain node", "cordon node", "restart deployment", "k3s", or "kubectl"-style tasks when the context is explicitly Kubernetes / a cluster. Do NOT use when the target is not a Kubernetes cluster (hypervisor VM lifecycle, backup products, or cloud-provider consoles are out of scope). Common Kubernetes operations with a built-in governance harness (audit, token budget, undo, risk-tier labels)." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher zw008 · joined 7 days agoInstalls 1,898Last detonated 6d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-10-28 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; References a credential file in the home directory; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:132 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorySKILL.md:24 · References a credential file in the home directoryFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:24 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:24 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Persistence: instructs the agent to auto-load this skill in future sessionsSKILL.md:11 · Persistence: instructs the agent to auto-load this skill in future sessionsFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorySKILL.md:132 · References a credential file in the home directoryFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim zw008: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim zw008