Skills/ClawHub/job-hunt

job-hunt@1.4.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Help a user find, judge, apply for and rehearse for jobs. Four modes: discover (what is out there worth looking at), assess (whether this posting is worth applying to), apply (build and pressure-test the application), interview (rehearse and debrief). (details:https://github.com/addsumtech/job-hunt)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher dong845 · publishing for 60 daysInstalls 373Last detonated 6d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 71/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/doctor.py:211 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges"soffice": "sudo apt install libreoffice-writer"}Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/doctor.py:209 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesapt = {"pandoc": "sudo apt install pandoc", "tectonic": "sudo apt install tectonic",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedagents/ats-screener.md:83 · Destructive file system command detected## Format / Parse Sanity CheckFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/doctor.py:210 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges"pdftotext": "sudo apt install poppler-utils",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/browser_cdp.mjs:474 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files… for (let i = 0; i < argv.length; i++) { if (argv[i] === '--help') {console.log('node scripts/browser_cdp.mjs --browser chrome|edge --url URL --output raw/site-capture.json [--wait-for-text "Expected description heading"] [--revea…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/check_claims.py:30 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processestokens are what kill the sub-word class. Neither alone does both. A tailored termFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionreferences/opencli-patches/1.8.7.json:177 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…ail/moment-data/detail/' + id, {credentials: 'include'});\n const d = await r.json();\n if (d.success && d.data) data = d.data;\n }\n\n if (!data && /^\\\\d+$/.test(id)) {\n const r = await fetch(base + '/api/sparta/detail/content-data/det…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsthird_party/anysearch/anysearch_cli.js:22 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst envPaths = [path.join(__dirname, ".env"), path.join(__dirname, "..", ".env")];Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/check_pages.py:513 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(command, capture_output=True, text=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/check_pages.py:200 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run([exe, "-q", str(path), "-"], capture_output=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionreferences/opencli-patches/1.8.7.json:178 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files… {credentials: 'include'});\n let result;\n try { result = await response.json(); }\n catch { throw new Error('Nowcoder detail HTTP ' + response.status + ': response is not valid JSON'); }\n if (!response.ok)\n throw new Error('Nowcoder de…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/lint_no_prediction.py:1203 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfile that can name `/etc/passwd` as a capture is a traversal, not a corpus.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/browser_cdp.mjs:482 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify({output:args.output, url:snapshot.url, http_status:snapshot.http_status, characters:snapshot.text.length, backend:'builtin-cdp'}));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/check_hidden_chars.py:125 · Python subprocess execution detectedlisting = subprocess.check_output(Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsthird_party/anysearch/anysearch_cli.js:37 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Skip empty values so an empty .env entry does not clobber a realFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/check_skill_lossless.py:134 · Python subprocess execution detectedlisting = subprocess.run(["git", "ls-tree", "-r", "--name-only", spec],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/deliver.py:1371 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(["pdftotext", str(pdf), "-"], capture_output=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/deliver.py:139 · Python subprocess execution detectedparsed = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/check_skill_lossless.py:144 · Python subprocess execution detectedblob = subprocess.run(["git", "show", f"{spec}:{rel}"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/deliver.py:797 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, **kwargs)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/deliver.py:1405 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(["pandoc", str(md), "-t", "plain", "--wrap=none"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/consistency.py:151 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# Calling this a conflict would wrongly kill viable applications, so it asks.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/doctor.py:128 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(RENDER_CV), str(profile),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/digest.py:221 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["osascript", "-e", script], check=False, timeout=10,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/mutants.py:91 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# That would inflate the kill rate with mutants that tested nothing.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/doctor.py:263 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run([node, "--input-type=module", "-e", probe,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/digest.py:224 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["notify-send", title, message], check=False, timeout=10,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/mutants-baseline.json:18 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"the unmutated tree is not green. Treat any sudden jump in the kill rate as this",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/mutants.py:215 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(argv, cwd=str(cwd), capture_output=True, text=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/doctor.py:351 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(c["install_argv"], capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="utf-8")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/mutants-baseline.json:17 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"re-runs the pristine copy before attributing any kill and aborts with exit 2 if",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/digest.py:583 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code"the agent, node/npx for its email tool, and opencli)")Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionthird_party/anysearch/anysearch_cli.js:427 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(output.join("\n"));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/run_tool.py:77 · Python subprocess execution detectedmetadata = subprocess.run([node, runtime['opencli'], args.args[0], '--help', '-f', 'yaml'],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/run_tool.py:120 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesor output.suffix != '.json' or output.exists()):Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/run_tool.py:158 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(command + args.args, env=env, capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/render_cv.py:2508 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/opencli_meta.py:34 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run([binary, site, "--help", "-f", "yaml"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/search_capture.py:138 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(command + arguments + ['--format', 'json'], env=env, capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/render_cv.py:2498 · Python subprocess execution detected`subprocess.run(..., capture_output=True)` and discarded the output — so a CVFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/setup_dependencies.py:42 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run([str(x) for x in argv], check=True, **kwargs)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/run_tool.py:46 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run([runtime['python'], str(Path(__file__).resolve()),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/run_tool.py:57 · Python subprocess execution detectedprobe = subprocess.run([node, str(SKILL / "scripts/browser_session.mjs"),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/run_tool.py:176 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(command + args.args, env=env).returncodeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/mutants.py:273 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# "killed" and reports a kill rate near 100%. This happened: one censusFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injectionreferences/market-conventions/nl.yaml:187 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction filequote: "De nieuwe werkgever moet dan samen met de werknemer een nieuw verzoek indienen; U moet tijdens de looptijd van de beschikking toetsen of de werknemer nog aan de inkomensnorm voldoet."Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionreferences/market-conventions/nl.yaml:182 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction filequote: "Voldoet u aan alle voorwaarden, vul het aanvraagformulier dan samen met uw werkgever in."Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,459 tok
1 file · 141 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

9 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim dong845: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  6. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim dong845Propose a patch to the maintainer